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High assurance computing and communication systems are evaluated to a high 
level of trust based in part on a formal verification that the actions of the system adhere to 
the established security policy.  This is important due to stringent requirements on high 
assurance systems and their development process.  The Common Criteria (CC) is used to 
evaluate, certify, and accredit systems and imposes requirements such that any system 
requiring a high level of trust (i.e. Evaluation Assurance Level 7 or EAL7), must undergo 
a rigorous life cycle including the use of formal verification of its security properties 
[Com06].  Examples include systems housing information at multiple classification 
levels, avionics software, missile guidance software, and even critical infrastructure 
management systems for water, power, and gas.  All of these types of systems are 
required to be correct and must not contain errors or malicious artifacts that might result 
in the leak of sensitive information or the loss of human life.  One way to ensure that the 
system is correct is to incorporate formal verification in the development life cycle. 
Formal verification is thus a necessity for high assurance systems, but the level of 
effort associated with manual verification can be unreasonable due to large and 
complicated proofs.  The use of an automated verification system can increase the 
efficiency and productivity of formal verification.  There are several verification systems 
available and the choice between such systems is important and must be considered 
carefully based on the scope of project requirements.   
In this thesis we analyzed Specware, a verification system developed by Kestrel 
Development Corporation, to determine the level of usefulness it could have in the 
verification of high assurance systems.  We are evaluating Specware as a candidate for 
use on the Trusted Computing Exemplar project [Irv04].  For our analysis we adapted a 
set of evaluation criteria presented by Ubhayakar [Ubh03].  We conducted a simple 
experiment as a basis for evaluation.  The experiment required familiarity with Specware 
and the capabilities of MetaSlang, Specware’s specification language.  The experiment 
consisted of creating a formal model with a basic security theorem based on a separation 
kernel security policy presented by Levin, Irvine, and Nguyen [Lev04].  Furthermore, we 
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created a formal top level specification as a refinement of the model and investigated the 
interlevel mapping capability within Specware.  We continued to evaluate Specware 
through analysis of its ability to automatically generate theorems and conjectures at each 
specification level as well as conjectures associated with the interlevel mapping.  Finally 
we analyzed Specware’s theorem proving capabilities by attempting to prove the basic 
security theorem in the formal model and all of the conjectures associated with the 
model, formal top level specification (FLTS), and interlevel mapping.   
This thesis presents our experimental findings and discusses the strengths and 
weaknesses of Specware corresponding to the adapted verification system evaluation 
criteria.  We will present a brief overview of Specware and MetaSlang and its basic 
components.  We will then describe the separation kernel formal model and FTLS 
developed in Specware and the technique used to produce the interlevel mapping.  
Finally, we will conclude with our analysis of Specware against the adapted evaluation 
criteria and present our conclusions and recommendations for future work.  Overall, we 
found Specware to be a powerful tool with potential to be highly useful in the verification 
of high assurance systems; however, currently, a few aspects of the tool has weaknesses.   
Specware is under continued development and progress will hopefully be made in these 
areas.   
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. FORMAL METHODS AND THEIR IMPORTANCE 
The process of developing a high assurance system is naturally arduous.  Yet the 
motivation to undergo such a process relies on the outcome provided.  When a high 
assurance system is completed and implemented, one can be assured with a high degree 
of confidence that the system will behave correctly and appropriately.  Appropriate 
behavior could be considered as system behavior that is intentional, free from malicious 
or inadvertent side affects.  When discussing what types of systems should be developed 
using a high assurance methodology, many examples are immediately present, including 
but not limited to medical technology systems, aviation systems, and multilevel secure 
systems.  Taking these examples one can immediately see how a small bug or glitch in 
the system could be disastrous, possibly resulting in the loss of human life.   
The high assurance methodology ensures that a system will undergo a rigorous 
development life cycle in order to eliminate bugs and prove that the functionality is 
necessary and sufficient.  The system must also be evaluated to determine its level of 
assurance.  The evaluation process incorporates stringent guidelines relating to the 
development life cycle.  The entire process is time consuming due to the guidelines that 
must be followed and heavy documentation associated with those guidelines.  Such 
documentation provides a clear outline that developers and engineers can follow in order 
to verify system requirements and functionality.  The documentation also serves as an 
invaluable reference for system maintenance.  And finally the documentation is used for 
system evaluation.  Although the process can seem almost overwhelming, it results in a 
system that can be verified to meet its specified requirements and desired functionality.  
This methodology is also vitally important when describing the security properties of the 
system.   
Formal methods are the use of mathematics to prove certain properties about a 
system.  Formal methods involve several levels of abstract descriptions of the system’s 
security properties and desired functionality.  Applying formal methods to the design and 
implementation of high assurance systems can be described through the following steps: 
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1. Security Policy 
2. Security Model 
3. Formal Top Level Specification 
4. Implementation  
For each step the appropriate verification must be achieved in order to maintain a 
correct mapping to the previous level, ending up back at the security policy.  The goal is 
to sequentially refine the security policy to the implementation of the system such that the 
implementation is shown to be a valid representation (i.e. “maps to”) the policy.  The 
process can seem quite simple yet it is quite rigorous.  It could take years to develop a 
high assurance system where the security policy is provably secure.  Due to the expense 
in terms of time, money, and expertise, formal methods are mostly used in the 
development of systems that require trusted security properties to protect high valued 
information.  One important reason formal methods are used is to provide a high level of 
confidence that the implementation meets the specification.  Thus formal methods 
provide assurance that the security properties will be provided as specified.  Another 
reason is that a formal security policy model provides developers with a single point of 
reference that defines exactly what is to be implemented.  Thus formal methods provide 
an accountability mechanism for the developers and a solid reference framework to 
ensure that the security of the system can be understood.  Landwehr described it well 
when stating that formal methods provide a concise organization of the complexity of 
“computer” and “security”.  Thus they provide a definition of what security actually 
means and how it can be determined with relation to the computer’s behavior [Lan81].  
Finally, formal methods provide the means to answer the question of whether the system 
is secure or not based on the proof of the basic security theorem. 
 
B. THE REFINEMENT PROCESS IN FORMAL METHODS 
As noted previously there are several levels of abstraction when applying formal 
methods to a system and security policy.  The term security policy can be quite vague if 
not put within the proper context.  Sterne distinguishes between the security policy 
objective, the organizational security policy, and the automated security policy [Ster91].  
In terms of formal methods, we are concerned with the automated security policy which 
is an abstract view of the desired functionality and security properties that the system 
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must contain or address.  It is free of implementation details and provides the reference 
for the entire formal methods process.  The construction of the automated security policy 
is vital as it serves as the backbone for the entire process.   
The next two phases are the construction of the formal security policy model 
(FSPM) and then the formal top level specification (FTLS).  The model is a 
mathematically structured statement of the security policy.  It is a logical representation 
of the security policy which basically takes the English language stated policy and 
formulates the mathematical equivalent.  Additionally, the model must make a significant 
progression toward the actual implementation of code.  The model serves as the first 
stepping stone in the process and is a high level abstraction between the security policy 
and the implementation of the system.  Keep in mind that the ultimate goal of this process 
is to ensure that the actual code behaves in no way violates the policy, and yet still 
contains the desired functionality.  Thus a system full of NOPs is not a violation of the 
policy, but provides no useful functionality.  The code preserves the security properties 
and is based ultimately from the model.  Thus the model must be an accurate 
representation of the policy in order to maintain a high level of assurance.  The model 
consists of two major components.  The first is a general model of a system plus a set of 
operations, and the second is a definition of security that constrains the system.  
Constraints are stated in the form of axioms and conjectures, which must be proven based 
on the constraints.  Ultimately, the basic security theorem must be proven true based on 
all the constraints put on the system.  Thus a secure system is defined as one in which all 
constraints are satisfied [Ubh03].   
The FTLS is the second level of abstraction from the policy and steps towards the 
implementation in terms of specificity. It defines all interfaces with appropriate 
parameters. It represents all inputs and outputs necessary for the system and also 
describes the exceptions and effects that processing will have on the state of the system.  .  
The FTLS describes all actions that the system takes and the impact that those actions 
will have on the security properties of the system.  The formal nature of the FTLS allows 
for proof that it maps to the model and transitively supports the security policy.   
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The FTLS must support three main goals. First, it must support a proof that the 
system design enforces the security policy.  Secondly, it must provide a basis for an 
analysis and catalogue of all covert storage channels. Lastly, it must provide a criterion of 
correctness for the implementation [NSA87].  The major difference between the security 
policy model and the FTLS is the level of specificity.  The important distinction is that 
the FTLS represents a significant progression from the policy to the implementation.  
This sequential progression must be provably secure in that each refinement is shown to 
map to the previous level of abstraction and ultimately the policy.  The sequential 
refinements can be quite challenging and the proofs can become cumbersome.  
Performing the proofs of the model and FTLS by hand could consume a large amount of 
time and human resources.  Thus the need for tools that aid in the refinement and 
representation of security models and policies is quite evident.   
 
C. VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 
The use of tools that improve the efficiency and correctness of the verification 
process is necessary to produce a secure system.  Tools that can assist in the verification 
of high assurance systems include formal specification languages and theorem provers. 
Languages provide a means to represent models and policies and to express the 
refinement of such models in a formal manner.  Theorem proving tools help to minimize 
the manual effort required to arrive at a valid proof.  Theorem provers can either be 
interactive or automatic.  An interactive prover requires the user to initiate proof 
commands to guide the system through the verification, whereas an automatic prover 
attempts to reach a proof without any guidance or involvement from the user except at 
the invocation of the prover.  Essentially a theorem prover processes specifications and 
determines if the conjectures are correct and valid.  A specification language can be used 
to specify a system and to declare conjectures and proof obligations.  We will briefly 
describe three tools that are in use to aid in the verification of high assurance systems.  
 
1. Ina Jo – Category Theoretic 
Ina Jo is the specification language processor included in the Paramax Formal 
Development Methodology (FDM) software [Par92].  The Ina Jo processor reads specs 
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that are written in the Ina Jo specification language and automatically generates 
correctness conjectures.  The FDM tool set includes two theorem provers, the Interactive 
Theorem Prover (ITP), and the Natural deduction Automated Theorem proving 
Environment (Nate).  Ina Jo is derived from first order logic with quantification.  An Ina 
Jo specification describes system states, state transitions, and correctness criteria.  Ina Jo 
also provides linguistic elements to describe multiple levels of abstraction as well as the 
mapping from one level to another.  The conjectures must then be proven and once they 
have been proven they become theorems.  Ina Jo theorems fall into three categories: 
• Initial condition theorems state that the initial states satisfy the correctness 
criteria. 
• Transform theorems state that transforms preserve the correctness criteria. 
• Mapping theorems state that a lower level spec properly implements its parent. 
 
Once Ina Jo has generated the conjectures the previously mentioned theorem 
prover is used to verify them.  Some nice features that Ina Jo provides include a precise 
way to state what level the specification represents through the use of the LEVEL 
statement.  Thus a declaration of the spec could appear as LEVEL model and then LEVEL 
ftls UNDER model [Par92]. 
 
2. PVS – Type Theoretic 
The Prototype Verification System (PVS) is a verification system that provides an 
interactive specification environment that supports writing formal models and 
specifications and theorem proving.  PVS provides an all inclusive environment that 
contains its own powerful specification language and interactive theorem prover 
[Ubh03].  Certain low level proof steps are automatically included in PVS, but the user 
must initiate the higher level steps to create goals and subgoals that need to be proven in 




3. Specware – Category Theoretic 
Specware is a utility created by Kestrel Institute which provides a specification 
language, MetaSlang, and the ability for refinement of specifications to produce code in a 
target programming language.  MetaSlang provides linguistic elements to describe 
multiple levels of refinement and its processor generates the associated proof obligations.  
Specware incorporates the theorem prover SNARK developed by SRI [Kes04].  
Specware comprises multiple specs and refinements of specs to ultimately produce 
provably correct code.  Refinement is conducted through the use of morphisms.  
Morphisms are a concept based from category theory which are defined by McDonald 
and Anton as truth preserving mappings of one spec into another [McD01].  Thus the two 
major stages in producing a Specware application include building the spec and then 
refining the spec [Kes04].  It is the intent of the rest of this document to analyze 
Specware and determine the degree to which it is useful in the verification of high 
assurance systems.  A more extensive overview of Specware is provided in Chapter III 
and Chapter IV provides an analysis of Specware’s application to the verification 
paradigm. 
 
D. THE VERIFICATION PARADIGM 
Due to the extensive nature of developing a high assurance system, it is important 
to choose a verification tool, or set of tools, that will be useful throughout the 
development process.  Ubhayakar presented a set of evaluation criteria for verification 
tools [Ubh03].  Ideally, the verification tool will support formal specifications, proofs, 
refinement and covert channel analysis, and provide adequate documentation of the same. 
  When determining a tool’s usefulness in the verification of high assurance 
systems, we desire to evaluate it based on a set of objective criteria in order to show its 
relative effectiveness.  The analysis is performed by developing specification models and 
proofs based on a security policy in the tools’ specification language.  In terms of the 
verification of high assurance systems, we are mainly concerned with the tools’ 
usefulness in developing the security policy model, FTLS, and the proofs associated with 
the mapping.  Naturally this type of analysis will depend on many factors that might exist 
beyond the initial set of evaluation criteria.  Such dependencies are very important and 
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should not be overlooked, for instance, suppose that a tool is found to be quite useful but 
requires expensive training costs.  The decision to use the tool must be made according to 
the available resources and development schedule.  Thus, it is important to state ahead of 
time, what criteria beyond the initial set should be considered when performing the 
analysis of the tool.  Ubhayakar [Ubh03] presented an initial table of evaluation criteria, 
which we have extended as seen in Table 1: 
 
Evaluation Criteria Definition Utility
Product Maturity A tool should be old enough 
and currently maintained and 
supported 
Specific questions need to be 
answered in a timely manner 
regarding syntax and 
specification language 
Usability of Tool and 
Verification 
Environment 
The level of simplicity and 
flexibility of operations 
provided to the user 
The interface and commands  
should be simple to 
understand and should 
provide syntax highlighting 
and error checking to 
increase efficiency 
Theorem Proving Interactive versus automated 
theorem proving  
Theorem proving should be 
easily integrated and 
provide meaningful 




Syntactical elements of the 
language 
Learning curve associated 
with language should be 
minimal to provide efficient 




Ability to test system directly 
from specification language 
Executable specifications 
provide the user with a 
general “feel” for the 
system 
Multiple Levels of 
Abstraction 
Refinement capabilities from 
more abstract specifications to 
more concrete specifications 
Multiple levels of 
abstraction provides ability 





Ability to automatically state 
items which must be proven 
This aids in ensuring that all 
obligations regarding the 
system are being addressed 
Semantics Powerful expression of logic 
with minimal complexity 
Underlying logic and 
foundational theory  affects 
the expressiveness of the 
tool regarding system 
properties 
Table 1. Specware Evaluation Criteria 
 
For this thesis, we will analyze Specware and determine its usefulness in the 
verification of high assurance systems.  We will develop formal specifications in 
Specware based upon a simple separation kernel security policy.  We will then analyze 
the specifications in order to describe the utility of Specware regarding the verification 
paradigm.  This analysis is not to determine Specware’s usefulness in the general sense, 
but to describe the level of its usefulness when developing a formal security policy model 
and FTLS and its proving capabilities.  The next chapter will provide an overview of 
Specware and describe its history as well as some projects that it has been used on.  
Following the discussion of Specware, we will present our experiment and analysis. 
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III. SPECWARE OVERVIEW 
A. SPECWARE DESCRIPTION 
Specware was developed and is supported by Kestrel Development Corporation 
and has been in production for over a decade.  The version of Specware used in this 
project is version 4.1.3.  The philosophy behind Specware is to provide an automated tool 
to aid in a refinement-based approach to formal software development.  Formal software 
development implies the rigorous construction of executable code that meets a well-
defined specification [McD01].  Specware’s refinement process is based on the 
mathematical foundation of category theory, which is concerned with the manner in 
which properties are preserved between different objects.  In category theory, morphisms 
are the relations between objects [Sri96].  The advantage of category theory as the 
foundation of Specware is that it enables the production of a well-defined stepwise 
refinement from an abstract specification to concrete implementation.  Specification 
morphisms preserve the structure of one specification through the translation to another 
specification and preserve theorems across the specifications [Sri95].  Thus refinement 
capabilities in Specware provide a logic-preserving process wherein each refinement can 
be proven to preserve the properties of the more abstract specification [McD01].  The 
entire goal of Specware is to provide a framework to produce provably correct code and 
aid in the development of efficient, high-assurance software [Pav03].   Based on the 
description of the verification paradigm and formal methods process, Specware’s 
foundation is appealing for developing high assurance systems. 
 
B. SPECWARE FUNCTIONALITY 
1. MetaSlang 
Specware is a tool to build and refine specifications, generate code from 
specifications, and prove properties regarding those specifications and refinements.  The 
specification language used in Specware is called MetaSlang.  The Specware Language 
Manual contains a detailed description of the MetaSlang grammar, including a BNF 
description.  MetaSlang includes syntactic constituents for describing functional 
semantics within a specificaiton as well as constructs for describing composition, 
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refinement, code generation, and proof capabilities.  Specification constituents include 
types, expressions, and axioms which can be used to describe domain-specific 
formalisms [Kes04].  The MetaSlang grammar follows a functional style of 
programming, which is valuable for proving properties regarding functions; however, the 
functional style causes issues when trying to represent state, which is discussed in 
Chapter V, Section E and future work.  The basics of MetaSlang are briefly described in 
this section, but the reader is recommended to refer to the Specware documentation for a 
more comprehensive explanation.   
 
a. Specs 
“A specification is a finite presentation of a theory in higher-order logic” 
[Sri95].  Specifications, or specs, provide the means to describe abstract concepts of the 
problem domain.  Specs contain types for describing collections of values and operations, 
or functions on those values.  Specs also contain axioms and definitions which define the 
actions and properties of types and operations.  A spec can be extended by importing 
other specs.  This copies the imported spec into the target spec creating a larger and 
potentially more complex spec.  Specs are also the objects used in morphisms which 
define the part-of or is-a relationship between two specs.  Morphisms allow for 
refinement of specs and provide the utility to take simple abstract specifications, and 
refine them to more concrete, complex specifications [Kes04].  The general form of a 




   {declaration} 
   ... 
endspec1
Figure 1.   Spec Definition 
 
                                                 




Types are collections, or sets, of objects and expressions that characterize 
those objects.  Specware has several inbuilt types provided in its libraries which are 
imported automatically for every spec processed by Specware.  Specware’s libraries 
continue to grow as time goes on and when creating specifications it is important to 
consider if they can be reused across multiple problem domains.  Some example type 
declarations are shown in Figure 2.  Notice in the definition of Mode the vertical bar 




type Mode = | READ | WRITE | EXECUTE 
Figure 2.   Type Declarations 
 
 
c. Ops and Defs 
An operation, or op in MetaSlang, is used to describe instantiations of 
types.  Ops are used to declare explicit types as well as declare functions that will 
perform an operation based on the types given in the declaration.  Figure 3 shows 
example of op declarations.  Ops can be monomorphic (i.e. strict typing) as seen by the 
definition of Name which can only be of type String.  My_Predicate is also an example of 
a monomorphic op that can only take a String as input and will only result in a Boolean 
value.  Ops can be polymorphic, as seen in My_Function, indicating that the op can be 
used across different types.  Thus My_Function takes two parameters of different or the 
same type and returns a value of a third type.  It is clear that the declaration of a 
polymorphic op describes little context for its use, but the definition of the op will bring 
clarity to its context and proper use.   
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  op Name : String 
%Polymorphic op 
  op My_Function: [a,b,c] a * b -> c 
  op My_Predicate: String -> Boolean 
Figure 3.   Op Declarations 
 
 
Once the operations have been declared, definitions, or defs, of ops are 
used to define the behavior and constraints (i.e. the semantics) of the ops.  Thus an op 
definition corresponds to a previously declared op and must correspond to the signature 
of the op declaration.  An op definition is considered a special notation for an axiom and 
is expresses the same logic that an axiom might express; however, a def might still have 
proof obligations associated with it, whereas an axiom is automatically assumed to be 
true and has no obligations.  Thus, it is encouraged to use defs as much as possible in 
order to be as precise as possible [Kes04].  A def can also be used to declare constants.  
Figure 4 shows the use of defs to declare a constant Limit and the definition of op f.   
 
 
 def Limit = 12 
%Declaration 
  op f : Nat -> Nat 
%Definition 
  def f(n) = 3*n 
   






d. Claims: Axioms, Conjectures, and Theorems 
Axioms, conjectures, and theorems are all considered types of claims 
within Specware.  All claims must be of type Boolean.  Conjectures and theorems are 
claims that must be proven through the use of op definitions and axioms.  Specware will 
automatically generate conjectures based on op declarations, but the user can also create 
conjectures as well [Kes04].  Currently, conjectures and theorems are synonymous in the 
way that the Specware processor handles the two types of claims, but as Specware 
becomes interoperable with other theorem provers, a difference might be distinguishable.  
Some example claim definitions are: 
 
axiom Example_1 is fa (x: Integer, y: Integer) 
f(x) = f(y) => x = y 
conjecture Example_2 is fa (w: Integer, z: Integer)  
(z*w = 0) => (z =0 || w = 0) 
theorem Example_3  is fa (a: System_Transform) 
Transform_Secure(a) 
Figure 5.   Claim Definitions 
 
 
2. Refinement and Morphisms 
The goal of refinement is to take an abstract description of a solution and develop 
a more precise description which can be shown to be a correct representation of the initial 
description.  The process of stepwise refinement provides a sequential composition of 
refinements where each refinement introduces new detail and is shown to preserve all 
previous properties [Sri95].  The refinement process in Specware consists of an initial 
specification that expresses the high level requirements and then continues with 
refinement specs that indicate design and implementation decisions.  Thus the stepwise 
refinement of specifications proves the existence of a valid implementation of the initial 
specification [Pav03].  The glue that connects each pair of refinement specs is the 
specification morphism. 
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In Specware the morphism from one specification (source) to another (target) is a 
property and structure-preserving mapping such that every type and op in the source spec 
is directly mapped to a type and op in the target spec.  The morphism allows us to speak 
of items (types, ops, axioms, and defs) in the target spec as images of items in the source 
spec.  The images of the axioms and definitions in the source spec are conjectures 
generated by Specware to be proven in the target spec.  Thus the morphism shows that all 
properties of the source spec are satisfied by the target spec.  Thus each level of 
refinement is shown to satisfy the conditions from the level above, providing a proof 
chain from the most concrete refinement to the initial specification [Kes04]. 
A morphism between two specifications is declared by indicating the source spec 
mapping to the target spec with a specialized arrow (i.e. +->) in between.  Specware will 
automatically map types and ops in the source spec to types and ops of the same name in 
the target spec.  If type names differ between specs, then the mapping between types 
must be made explicitly.  Every type and op in the source specification must map to 
another type and op in the target.  The syntactic elements of the morphism include the # 
symbol which is used to identify the particular spec within the file, and the +-> symbol 
which is the mapping symbol used to express individual element mapping.  An example 
morphism declaration is seen in Figure 6. 
 
Sample_Morphism =  
  morphism Source_Filename#Source_Spec ->  
    Target_Spec { 
       source_type1 +-> target_type1, 
       source_op1 +-> target_op1} 
Figure 6.   Sample Morphism Declaration 
 
 
3. Proof Obligations 
Proof obligations are properties regarding relationships of items within a 
specification and must be shown to be true in order for the specification to be correct.  
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Specware automatically generates proof obligations for definitions and the user can also 
state explicit obligations in the form of conjectures or theorems.  Proof obligations are 
also automatically generated for a morphism.  Proof obligations that are automatically 
generated within specs are typically related to type checking and op definitions.  
Automatically generated obligations do not appear within the original spec, and in order 
for the spec to be proven true, the user must invoke them by using obligations command. 
This command can be present in the definition of a unit, as seen in Figure 7 or it can be 
given from the Specware shell in combination with the show command.  We will discuss 
the Specware shell environment in the next section. 
Once the obligations have been invoked, they can then be proved using the prove 
command [Kes04].  Obligations must be proved one at a time, but not necessarily 
sequentially.  For organization purposes, we found it beneficial to maintain a separate file 
containing only proof units which assigns proof obligations unique identifiers.  This 
allowed us to select which proofs should be attempted in a proving session as opposed to 
attempting all proofs in every proving session.  Figure 7 is an example of a file that 
assigns proof obligations from a given spec to a unit and it also demonstrates assigning 
individual proof obligations from the same spec to proof units.  Note that a unit 
references a label to an assigned element in Specware (e.g. p1 is a unit). 
 
   spec_obligations = obligations File#Sample_Spec 
   p1 = prove obligation1 in File#spec_obligations 
   p2 = prove obligation2 in Spec#spec_obligations 
Figure 7.   Proof and Obligation Declarations 
 
This technique allows for unambiguous identification of obligations and provides 
a reference when analyzing the log files associated with each proof attempt.  If the 
theorem prover is not able to prove the claims, this does not mean that the proof does not 
exist as the theorem prover may not be smart enough to figure it out.  If a proof fails, the 
user can walk through the proof by hand and determine if a solution exists or if the 
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specification needs modification.  Obligations associated with a morphism can be seen 
using the show obligations command within the Specware shell.  The Specware 
processor will generate a separate spec which will contain all obligations necessary to 
satisfy the morphism [Kes04].  Figure 8 shows the way to view our Sample_Morphism 
oblgations from within the Specware shell. 
 
show obligations Filename#Sample_Morphism 
Figure 8.   Morphism Obligations 
 
4. Specware Shell 
The processing of Specware specifications is performed within the Specware 
shell.  The Specware shell is a command line environment.  The Specware distribution 
package comes with XEmacs which can run the Specware shell, but the Specware shell 
can be run outside of XEmacs.  XEmacs provides some features, such as syntax 
highlighting, that are useful for spec development in MetaSlang.  The Specware shell 
contains several commands including basic file system operations such as cd and dir but 
also commands specific to processing Specware units such as the proc and show 
commands.  The show command can be used to display the contents of units or proof 
obligations.  Within the Specware shell, the user can create and process specs, generate 
proof obligations, send obligations to a theorem prover, and even evaluate constructive 
MetaSlang expressions [Kes04].  Readers are encouraged to review the Specware 




In summary, Specware is a tool intended to aid in the process of formal software 
development through the use of stepwise refinement.  The mathematical foundation of 
Specware refinement is category theory which provides a mathematical foundation for 
describing the relationships between objects and operations.  This foundation allows us to 
describe and prove the relationship between specifications.  Specifications are written in 
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MetaSlang.  Specs contain types, ops, and claims (e.g. axioms, conjectures, and theorems) 
which formally represent the logic of a specific problem domain.  The concept of 
stepwise refinement is achieved through the use of morphisms.  A morphism is a 
relationship between specifications that describes how the properties of one map to the 
properties of another.  All conditions of the source spec must be satisfied in the target 
spec in order for the morphism to be proper.  Thus final refinement specification is shown 
to preserve the properties from the abstract specification.   
Next we will analyze how Specware and its refinement features support the 
verification of high assurance systems.  We will describe the development of a formal 
model in Specware based on a separation kernel security policy.  Then we will describe 
the development of an FTLS in Specware as a refinement of the model.  We will use the 
morphism feature in Specware to achieve the interlevel mapping and thus demonstrate 

















































IV. SPECWARE AND THE VERIFICATION PARADIGM 
A. SEPARATION KERNEL OVERVIEW 
To conduct our analysis of Specware within the verification paradigm we chose to 
create a policy model and FTLS of a separation kernel.  A separation kernel provides a 
partitioning of all system resources under its control into blocks such that actions taken 
by active entities within any particular block are isolated and undetected by entities in 
other blocks.  A separation kernel achieves this partitioning and isolation of entities 
through management and virtualization of shared resources such that each block is 
assigned a resource set over which it believes itself to have complete control.  The only 
manner in which a block might communicate with another block is if a means for 
communication has been established explicitly.  Such information flow properties are 
desirable in environments where certain flows are allowed based upon a flow policy.  
One example might be a Multi-Level Secure (MLS) system that manages a flow policy 
between different classification levels of data.  Levin, Irvine, and Nguyen defined a 
model for a static separation kernel which provides least privilege information flow 
[Lev04].  For a comprehensive understanding of this model we recommend referencing 
the paper, but we will provide an overview of the model and discuss its specification 
within Specware. 
The least privilege separation kernel model consists of a set of resources, a set of 
operations, a set of modes of flow (i.e. Read, Write, Read & Write), a distinct partitioning 
of the resources into a set of blocks, a block-to-block flow function, and a subject-to-
resource flow function.  The set of resources is composed of internal resources, i.e. those 
which are only available to the kernel, and exported resources to which an explicit 
reference is possible via the separation kernel interface [Lev04].  The set of resources is 
partitioned into blocks, where every resource belongs to one and only one block.  
Subjects are a subset of exported resources which represent the active entities of the 
system, such as processes, programs, etc.  Subjects can invoke certain modes of flow with 
respect to other exported resources.  The notion of this flow is called an effect, which 
consists of a subject, resource, and mode of flow.  Note that the resource can be another 
subject, the only stipulation being that within an effect, the resource, or passive entity, is 
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an exported resource.  The set of all possible effects is the cross product of the set of 
subjects, exported resources, and modes of flow.  Next the model describes the notion of 
the flow policy.  The flow policy dictates what types of flows are allowed between 
blocks, and what types of flows are allowed between subjects and resources.  The block-
to-block flow function defines the set of allowed flows between blocks.  The subject-to-
resource flow function defines the set of allowed flows between subjects and exported 
resources.  Thus the subject-to-resource flow function and the block-to-block function 
together express the flow policy. 
An operation is associated with a set of effects.  For example, if the separation 
kernel includes a read operation, there might be several effects associated with that read 
depending on the implementation of the operation.  Thus all operations possess a set of 
effects.  The notion of a secure operation is defined as an operation in which all of its 
effects are considered secure.  A secure effect is one in which the given flow between the 
subject and resource is allowed by the policy, as well as the flow between the blocks in 
which the subject and resource reside is allowed by the policy.  Finally a secure system is 
one in which all of its operations are secure [Lev04].  The paper also goes on to describe 
the notion of partial ordering of blocks and a trusted partial ordering using trusted 
subjects; but for this work we did not implement the trusted partial ordering and refer the 
reader to the paper for a more comprehensive understanding of this aspect.  Next we will 
describe our specification of the model within Specware. 
 
B. DESCRIPTION OF SEPARATION KERNEL MODEL IN SPECWARE 
1. Type Declarations 
As described earlier, once the security policy has been clearly defined, the next 
step is to represent the policy in a formal model.  The model states the essence of the 
policy in a basic security theorem, which must be proved in order to verify that the model 
is consistent with the policy.  In this section we describe the specification of the 
separation kernel model written in Specware’s Metaslang.  The complete specification for 
the separation kernel model is given in Appendix A.  First we declare a type called 
Resource which indicates the set of all resources available to the kernel.  We then 
proceed to define a subtype Exported_Resource which indicates all resources which are 
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  op exported? : Resource -> Boolean 
type Exported_Resource = (Resource | exported?) 
 
Figure 9.   Resource and Exported_Resource type declarations  
 
In Specware we declare Exported_Resource as a subtype using a predicate that 
satisfies some condition indicating that it is an exported resource.  This condition is left 
abstract and does not need to be defined in the model.  Next we define subtype of 
Exported_Resource called a Subject.  We declare Subject as a subtype in a very similar 
fashion as we defined the subtype Exported_Resource by using a predicate that must be 
true in order for it to be a subject.  The definition of the subject predicate is left abstract 
in the model, but in the FTLS we refine the definition of the predicate.  Notice that 
constructing subtypes in this manner provides a proper containment of elements such that 
Subject is a subset of Exported_Resource which is a subset of Resource.  Figure 10 shows 
the declaration of subtype Subject. 
 
 
  op subject? : Exported_Resource -> Boolean 
type Subject = (Exported_Resource | subject?) 
 
Figure 10.   Subject type declaration 
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Following the Subject declaration we complete the type declarations by declaring 
the Block, Mode, Effect, and Operation types.  The Block declaration utilizes the Sum 
type feature in Specware, which allows a partitioning of the type being declared.  Thus 
for our Block declaration we declare names for blocks with which resources will later be 
associated.  We use the terms High, Medium, and Low to represent how separation 
kernels are sometimes used, but these are merely labels and will have no semantic 
designation.  Type Mode indicates the modes of flow that are taking place in the system 
and is declared in a similar fashion to Block such that the only modes of flow are RD (for 
Read), WR (for Write), RW (for Read/Write), and NULL.  The declaration of the Effect 
type uses what is known in Specware as a record type where each effect consists of a 
subject which is of type Subject, a resource which is of type Exported_Resource, and a 
flow which is of type Mode.  The final type declaration is an Operation which consists of 
a List of effects, or all the effects that are associated with each operation.  Figure 11 
shows the final type declarations. 
 
   
  type Block = | High | Medium | Low 
  type Mode = | RD | WT | RW | NULL 
  type Effect = {subject: Subject, 
         resource: Exported_Resource, 
         flow: Mode} 
  type Operation = List Effect 
 
Figure 11.   Block, Mode, Effect, and Operation type declarations 
 
2. BB, SR, and Partition Function Declarations 
Following the type declarations we declare functions that allow us to express the 
allocation of the resources to blocks as well as determine what types of flows are allowed 
between blocks and what types of flows are allowed between subjects and resources.  
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First we declare a polymorphic predicate that is used to indicate which entity is the active 
entity for both policies.  This predicate is given the name active?, where the general 
convention for predicates is to end their names with a question mark signifying that it is a 
Boolean expression.   
Next we declare the BB function which represents the block-to-block flow policy.  
This function takes two blocks, b1 and b2, where b1 is the block of the active entity that 
causes the flow.  The function returns the list of modes of flow that subjects in b1 are 
allowed to perform on resources in b2.  We make this distinction in order for the model to 
be able to express a policy which allows, for example, the flow [b1, b2, RD], but does not 
allow the flow [b2, b1, WR].  In this case, the direction of the flow is the same 
(information is flowing from b2 to b1), however, the cause of the flow is different.  
The SR function represents the subject-to-resource flow policy and is declared in a 
similar fashion as the BB function.  The SR function takes a subject and exported resource 
as parameters, where the subject is the active entity, and returns a list of modes flow that 
the subject is allowed to perform on the exported resource.  Note that this policy 
definition allows flows between two subjects, since subjects are defined as exported 
resources, which is why we declare the Subject to be the active entity.   
Finally we declare the Partition function which takes an exported resource as 
input and returns the block in which it resides.  In Specware, when a function is declared 
it is naturally assumed to be well-define and no constraint is needed to discuss its totality.  
Thus the Partition function is total, such that every exported resource is assigned to 
exactly one block, but multiple resources could map to the same block.  Note that we 
need not define how the policy relations are populated.  This is a convenient abstraction 
leaving the details of the initialization of these policies as a refinement.  Figure 12 shows 
the declarations of these functions.  
 
 
  op active? : [a] a -> Boolean 
  op BB : {(b1,b2): Block*Block |  
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                    active? (b1)} -> List Mode 
  op SR : {(s1,r2): Subject*Exported_Resource |  
                    active? (s1)} -> List Mode 
  op Partition : Exported_Resource -> Block  
 
Figure 12.   active?, BB, SR, and Partition Function Declarations 
 
 
3. Policy Description Functions – SecureEffect and SecureOP 
Now that we have described the types and functions that exist within the system, 
we need to express certain qualities about the security of the system.  We do this by 
defining what it means for an effect and an operation to be secure.  As mentioned 
previously a secure effect is an effect in which the flow is allowed based on the subject-
to-resource and the block-to-block flow policies.  Thus we can declare a function called 
SecureEffect which returns true if the effect is in fact secure.  The definition of 
SecureEffect states that either the flow is NULL, which means that the subject will 
perform no action on the resource, or the flow is allowed by the BB and SR functions.  
Once we have the notion of a secure effect we can describe a secure operation in which 
all effects associated with the operation are secure. SecureOP is defined as an iterative 
search through the list of effects associated with the operation.  The iteration clause states 
that if the operation consists of a head element, hd, and a tail, tl, which is another list of 
elements, then continue the process through the list by checking the head and recursively 
processing the tail. If all of the effects are found to be secure, then the entire operation is 
considered to be secure and the function will return true.  Figure 13 shows the definition 




  op SecureEffect : Effect -> Boolean 
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 def SecureEffect (effect) =  
    (effect.flow = NULL || 
    (member(effect.flow, BB(Partition(effect.subject),  
                            Partition(effect.resource))) 
   && 
   member(effect.flow, SR(effect.subject,  
                            effect.resource)))) 
 
  op SecureOP : Operation -> Boolean 
 def SecureOP (operation) = case operation of 
                            | nil -> true 
                            | Cons(hd, tl) -> 
                                 (SecureEffect(hd) && 
            SecureOP(tl)) 
 
Figure 13.   SecureEffect and SecureOP definitions 
 
4. Model Axiom and Basic Security Theorem 
Before we can state the basic security theorem we need to include an axiom to 
support the basic security theorem.  The axiom operations states that for all effects and 
operations, if an effect is a member of an operation, then its flow is either RD, WT, or RW 
and the flow is allowed by the BB and SR policies.  Essentially this implies that all effects 
in an operation are secure, which implies that the operation is secure.  In our initial 
development of the model we defined three operations that met the same properties as 
this axiom; however, we encountered mapping problems with our initial approach and 
resorted to stating this axiom.  The mapping problem we encountered regarded the fact 
that we could not map multiple operations in the FTLS to only one operation in the 
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model.  We will discuss this mapping problem further in Chapter V, Section C-6.  It is 
important to remember the operations axiom because it will become a conjecture in the 
FTLS which must be proved based on our definitions of the operations. 
Finally we can state the theorem which must be proved in order to ensure that the 
system is secure.  The theorem plainly states that in order for the system to be secure, all 
operations must be secure.  This is proved using the definitions and axioms we have 
already described.  The basic security theorem does prove within Specware using Snark.  
Figure 14 shows the declarations of the axioms and security theorem. 
 
 
  %Axiom 
      axiom operations is 
        fa(e: Effect, o: Operation)  
      member(e,o) =>  
       (e.flow = RD &&  
        member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject),  
                              Partition(e.resource))) && 
        member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource))) 
       || 
       (e.flow = WT &&  
        member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject),  
                              Partition(e.resource))) && 
        member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource))) 
       || 
       (e.flow = RW &&  
        member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject),  
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                              Partition(e.resource))) && 
        member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource))) 
 
  %Theorem 
    theorem Secure is 
            fa(o: Operation) SecureOP(o) 
 
Figure 14.   Model Axioms and Basic Security Theorem 
 
It can be seen that the model for the separation kernel security policy is fairly 
concise and yet provides enough detail to accurately express the security policy.  The 
model is a significant progression towards the implementation and can now be refined 
through morphisms in Specware.  Since the security theorem has been proved in the 
model, if we can prove that the FTLS satisfies the morphism theorems, then it too will 
satisfy the security theorem in the model.  The FTLS will provide greater detail of the 
separation kernel and will provide more concrete descriptions of abstract concepts 
presented in the model. 
 
C. DESCRIPTION OF SEPARATION KERNEL FTLS IN SPECWARE 
1. FTLS Type Declarations 
In the model many type declarations were undefined abstractions.  In the FTLS, 
we refine the type declarations to more closely indicate how the implementation will 
represent those types.  The complete FTLS is given in Appendix B, which is a subset of 
the Least Privilege Separation Kernel FTLS.  In the FTLS we declare the type Object 
which represents a more concrete description of the Resource declared in the model.  In 
the FTLS an object can either be a process with a unique ID, a segment in memory with a 
unique ID and a size, an eventcount, or a sequencer.  Reed & Kanodia describe how 
eventcounts and sequencers can provide process synchronization of execution without the 
need for mutual exclusion [Ree79].  As a result, sufficient process synchronization can be 
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achieved within the bounds of secure information flow.  It is recommended to read the 
work of Reed & Kanodia to have a better understanding of how eventcounts and 
sequencers manage information flow and process synchronization. 
After the declaration of the Object type, we refine the concept of a Subject by first 
using the same method for declaring an exported object as in the model.  There is no 
difference between the declaration of an exported object in the FTLS and an exported 
resource in the model.  Since all subjects are exported objects, but not all exported 
objects are subjects, we defined an abstract predicate in the model called subject?.  In the 
FTLS we refine the same predicate regarding a subject by stating that a subject is a 
process.  We achieve this by constructing the predicate to be true if there exists a natural 
number such that the object given as input to the predicate equals the process associated 
with the number.  The rest of the declarations in the FTLS are the same as in the model, 
except in the FTLS we declare type Transform as opposed to Operation.  Figure 15 
shows the FTLS type declarations. 
 
   
%Types 
     type Object = | Process {id: Nat} 
                   | Segment {id: Nat, size: Nat} 
                   | EventCT (Nat) 
                   | Sequencer (Nat) 
       op exported? : Object -> Boolean 
     type Exp_Object = (Object | exported?) 
 
       op subject? : Exp_Object -> Boolean 
      def subject? (process) =  
           ex(n: Nat) process = Process {id=n} 
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     type Subject = (Exp_Object | subject?) 
 
     type Block = | High | Medium | Low 
     type Mode = | RD | WT | RW | NULL 
     type Effect = {subject: Subject, 
                    resource: Exp_Object, 
                    flow: Mode} 
     type Transform = List Effect 
 
Figure 15.   FTLS Type Declarations 
 
2. FTLS Function Declarations 
The function declarations in the model were only refined slightly in the FTLS; 
however, we added another detail regarding the system with the notion of a 
CurrentAccess table.  This is similar to the current access matrix described in the Bell & 
Lapadula model, which is an abstraction of the hardware segment descriptors through 
which access to memory is controlled [Bel73].  For example, the kernel substantiates a 
processes right to access the memory protected by a descriptor before providing it to the 
process.  Thereafter, the process has “current access” such that it can access memory 
without kernel mediation.  Thus the CurrentAccess table represents the processor local 
descriptor table.  We also state some basic axioms regarding the state of the effects of the 
system such that an effect is in the CurrentAccess table, only if it is in the SR table.  
Similarly we state that an effect is in the SR table, only if it is in the BB table.  As in the 
model, the combination of the SR and BB tables represent an encoding of the security 
policy.  The addition of the CurrentAccess table allows us to express properties regarding 
effects associated with transforms.  Figure 16 shows the FTLS function declarations 




  op active? : [a] a -> Boolean 
  op CurrentAccess :  
            Subject * Exp_Object * Mode -> Boolean 
 
  op BB : {(b1,b2): Block*Block |  
                    active? (b1)} -> List Mode 
  op SR : {(s1,r2): Subject*Exp_Object |  
                    active? (s1)} -> List Mode 
  op Partition : Exp_Object -> Block  
   
axiom CurrentAccess_implies_SR is 
     fa(e: Effect)  
     CurrentAccess(e.subject, e.resource, e.flow) => 
       member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource)) 
 
axiom SR_implies_BB is 
     fa(e: Effect)  
       member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource)) => 
         member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject),  
                           Partition(e.resource))) 
 
Figure 16.   FTLS Function Declarations and CurrentAccess Axioms 
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Following the function declarations in the FTLS, we include the model’s security 
policy descriptions of the active?, BB, SR, and Partition functions (see Figure 12), which 
need no further refinement.  The following section discusses the declarations of the 
transforms. 
 
3. FTLS Transforms 
In the separation kernel model we declared there to be a type or set of 
Operation(s) and we did not further discuss any members of the set within the model.  
We simply left them as an abstraction and constrained properties regarding all operations.  
As mentioned previously, we refine the abstract type Operation in the FTLS to be a type 
Transform.  We then enumerate all the transforms that will exist in the system.  In 
Specware, we can define an element of a certain type by declaring an op of the desired 
type.  We can also provide certain constraints within this declaration as well.  Since a 
transform is a list of effects, we want to ensure that if an effect is a member of the 
transform then it satisfies certain properties.  This is also vital to uphold the proof that the 
FTLS is a proper refinement of the model. 
In the FTLS we declare seven transforms: HW_Read, HW_Write, Read_Write, 
Ticket, Read_EventCT, Adv_EventCT, and Await_EventCT.  These all have certain 
semantics, so rather than declare them all to be of type Transform, we can add constraints 
within the declaration.  This also eliminates the need for axioms that convey these 
constraints later in the specification.  An example of such constraints can be seen in the 
definition of HW_Read.  We want to ensure that if an effect is a member of HW_Read, 
then the effect’s flow is of type RD and the effect is actually allowed based on the 
CurrentAccess table.  Each transform has similar but not exact constraints.  Figure 17 
shows the declarations of the transforms. 
 
 
op HW_Read :  
  {t1: Transform | fa(e: Effect)  
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                     member(e, t1) =>  
                       (e.flow = RD &&  
                        CurrentAccess(e.subject, 
                                      e.resource, 
                                      e.flow))} 
 
op HW_Write :  
  {t2: Transform | fa(e: Effect)  
                     member(e, t2) =>  
                       (e.flow = WT &&  
                        CurrentAccess(e.subject, 
                                      e.resource, 
                                      e.flow))} 
 
op Read_Write : 
  {t3: Transform | fa(e: Effect)  
                     member(e, t3) =>  
                       (e.flow = RW &&  
                        CurrentAccess(e.subject, 
                                      e.resource,  
                                      e.flow))} 
 
op Ticket :  
  {t4: Transform | fa(e: Effect)  
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                     (member(e, t4) => 
                        (e.flow = RW &&  
                         CurrentAccess(e.subject,  
                                       e.resource,  
                                       e.flow))) 
                         && 
                         length(t4) = 1} 
 
op Read_EventCT :  
  {t5: Transform | fa(e: Effect)  
                     (member(e, t5) => 
            (e.flow = RD &&  
                         CurrentAccess(e.subject,  
                                       e.resource,  
                                       e.flow))) 
             && 
             length(t5) = 1} 
op Adv_EventCT :  
  {t6: Transform | fa(e: Effect)  
                     (member(e, t6) => 
            (e.flow = WT &&  
                         CurrentAccess(e.subject,  
                                       e.resource,  
                                       e.flow))) 
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             && 
             length(t6) = 1} 
 
op Await_EventCT :  
  {t7: Transform | fa(e: Effect)  
                     (member(e, t7) => 
             (e.flow = RD &&  
                          CurrentAccess(e.subject,  
                                        e.resource,  
                                        e.flow))) 
              && 
              length(t7) = 1} 
 
Figure 17.   Transform Declarations 
 
These declarations indicate specific elements of the type Transform.  Thus the 
only remaining constraint we need regarding transforms is to declare that these are the 
only transforms that exist in the system.  We also state some constraints regarding the 
resources within the effects of each transform.  We provide these constraints as axioms 
discussed in the next section. 
 
4. FTLS Axioms 
The only additional semantics that need to be defined in the FTLS pertain to the 
transforms that have been declared.  These semantics are achieved through the axioms 
seen in Figure 18.  First we need to ensure that the transforms declared are the only 
transforms in the system.  We do this through an axiom stating that for every entity of 
type transform must be one of the seven declared transforms.  Another constraint 
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regarding transforms pertains to their effects.  Each transform contains a list of effects 
and each effect contains a resource.  We need to constrain the resources of effects 
associated with certain transforms based on the nature of the transform.  For the 
HW_Read, HW_Write, and Read_Write transforms, their resources should be segments.  
The resources of Ticket should be sequencers, and the resources of the Read_EventCT, 
Adv_EventCT, and Await_EventCT should be an eventcount.  These constraints were not 
included as part of the transform declarations mainly to reduce redundancy within the 
declarations and to provide clarity of the sets of transforms associated with each type of 
resource.  We add these constraints through two axioms stating that if a transform is 
equal to HW_Read, HW_Write, or Read_Write, then for all of its effects there exists a 
segment that equals each effect’s resource.  The same is done for the eventcount axiom as 
seen in Figure 18. 
 
 
axiom only_ops is 
      fa(t:Transform) t = HW_Read       ||  
          t = HW_Write      ||  
          t = Read_Write    || 
          t = Ticket        || 
          t = Read_EventCT  || 
          t = Adv_EventCT   || 
          t = Await_EventCT  
axiom Segment_as_Object is 
      fa(e: Effect, t: Transform) 
    ex(n1: Nat, n2: Nat) 
     ((t = HW_Read)     ||  
      (t = HW_Write)    ||  
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      (t = Read_Write)) && 
     member(e, t) => 
                e.resource = Segment{id=n1, size=n2} 
 
    axiom EventCT_as_Object is 
          fa(e: Effect, t: Transform) 
        ex(n: Nat) 
         ((t = Read_EventCT)   || 
          (t = Adv_EventCT)    || 
          (t = Await_EventCT)) && 
         member(e, t) =>  
                    e.resource = EventCT (n) 
 
    axiom Ticket_as_Object is 
          fa(e: Effect, t: Transform) 
        ex(n: Nat) 
        (t = Ticket) && 
         member(e, t) => e.resource = Sequencer (n) 
 
Figure 18.   FTLS Transform Axioms 
 
The FTLS is now complete and now we must show that it preserves the security 





D. MORPHISM IN SPECWARE 
The mapping between the model and the FTLS is done through Specware’s 
morphism capability.  Every entity in the source must map to an entity in the target in 
order for the morphism to be correct.  Specware does a good job of pattern matching in 
morphisms, thus it will automatically map entities with the same names without an 
explicit declaration.  For example, in the separation kernel model we declare a type 
Subject and we also declare a type Subject in the FTLS.  Thus in the mapping Specware 
automatically maps the model Subject to the FTLS Subject.  Therefore, the only explicit 
declarations we need to make in the morphism are the mappings from entities in the 
model that do not have the same name as their corresponding entities in the FTLS.  We 
declare the morphism as a separate unit within Specware which allows us to generate 
proof obligations based on that unit.  The morphism consists of mapping the type 
Resource to type Object, type Exported_Resource to type Exp_Obj, and type Operation 
to type Transform.  All other mappings do not need explicit declaration, but could be 
added for clarity.  The morphism will process successfully through the syntax checker 
and prover if all entities have been mapped appropriately such that all properties and 
structures are preserved.  As a result of the morphism, all definitions of operations and 
axioms in the model become conjectures that must be proven in the FTLS.   
Figure 19 shows the morphism and Figure 20 shows the associated conjectures 
generated by the show obligations command given within the Specware shell.  We 
defined the morphism as the unit Mapping.  The morphism between the model and the 
FTLS generates conjectures based on the definitions of SecureEffect and SecureOP, and 
the operations axiom.  The SecureEffect and SecureOP conjectures appear as a result of 
using the op structure to define macro logic in the model.  Normally we would not expect 
these functions to appear in the FTLS because they are only used to bring clarity to the 
definition of a “secure system”.  Another interesting item to note is that when we 
generated the proof obligations for the morphism, Specware produced two obligations 
with the same name, SecureOp_def.  We defined two separate proof units in order to try 
to prove each obligation; however, we could not verify that we were actually 
disambiguating the two obligations.  We are not sure as to the reason Specware generated 
two conjectures with the same name, but this was the only point when we encountered 
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this problem and we will discuss this further in Chapter V.  One other bug within the 
morphism obligations resides in the definition of Secure_OP_def where it refers to 
Operation.  This should refer to Transform (since it is being proved based on the FTLS) 
as seen in the operations conjecture.  It is not known why this bug occurred, and will 
hopefully be addressed in the future.   
 
 
Mapping =  
morphism final_model#model ->  
         final_ftls#ftls{Resource +-> Object, 
           Exported_Resource +-> Exp_Object, 
         Operation +-> Transform} 
 
Figure 19.   Morphism Declaration 
 
 
conjecture operations is  
    fa(e : Effect, o : Transform)  
     member(e, o) => 
        e.flow = RD && 
        member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject),  
                          Partition(e.resource))) && 
        member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource))  
        ||  
        e.flow = WT &&  
        member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject), 
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                          Partition(e.resource))) &&  
        member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource))  
        || 
        e.flow = RW && 
        member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject),  
                          Partition(e.resource))) && 
        member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource)) 
 
conjecture SecureEffect_def is  
    fa(effect : Effect)  
        SecureEffect effect =  
          (effect.flow = NULL  
           || member(effect.flow, 
                     BB(Partition(effect.subject), 
                        Partition(effect.resource)))  
              && member(effect.flow, SR(effect.subject, 
                                        effect.resource))) 
 
conjecture SecureOP_def is  
    fa(nil : Operation)  
     fa(operation : Operation)  




conjecture SecureOP_def is  
    fa(hd : Effect, tl : List(Effect))  
     fa(operation : Operation)  
        ~(nil = operation) &&  
        Cons(hd, tl) = operation => 
                        SecureOP operation =  
                          (SecureEffect hd && SecureOP tl) 
 
Figure 20.   Morphism Proof Obligations 
 
We have now completed the construction of the formal model and FTLS and 
shown the mechanism for the interlevel mapping.  In Chapter V we discuss the analysis 
of Specware, within the verification paradigm, against the evaluation criteria presented in 












V. ANALYSIS OF SPECWARE AGAINST EVALUATION 
CRITERIA 
A. INTRODUCTION TO ANALYSIS 
The previous chapter discussed our development of the separation kernel formal 
model, FTLS, and interlevel mapping.  In this chapter we will critique the process of our 
experiment and present our analysis of Specware for use in the verification of high 
assurance systems.  We based our analysis on a set of evaluation criteria.  The evaluation 
criteria were motivated by prior work in the evaluation of verification systems by 
Ubhayakar [Ubh03].  Further motivation was based on requirements set forth by the 
Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX) project [Irv04].  We will provide a brief overview 
of the evaluation criteria and then present our analysis of Specware. 
 
B. OVERVIEW OF EVALUATION CRITERIA 
In this experiment, we analyzed Specware’s capabilities in eight key areas.  These 
areas represent properties that a verification system must exhibit in order to be effective 
in the verification of high assurance systems.  The eight properties provide the basis for 
our analysis of a verification system (or “tool”) and are: product maturity, usability of the 
tool and its verification environment, theorem proving capabilities, specification 
language, executable specifications, multiple levels of abstraction, automatic generation 
of conjectures, and semantics.  Product maturity relates to the age and current support of 
the system as well as its popularity in terms of past and current projects.  Usability of the 
tool and its verification environment refers to how complicated the system is for users 
and the level of training required to use the system effectively.  A tool’s theorem proving 
capabilities must be adequate in order to provide the assurance that the specifications 
satisfy the requirements.  Not only must the theorem prover be capable of proving 
complex theorems, but it also must provide intuitive dialog with the user regarding 
success or failure of proofs.  The specification language must be able to represent the 
logic of security theorems, state machines and at least first order logic with 
quantification.  The syntactic elements should be simple enough to allow for the entire 
development team to clearly understand the specification.  Executable specifications 
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provide the development team with a way to test certain aspects of the systems without 
the introduction of further detail.  The tool must be able to represent multiple levels of 
abstraction in order to provide a sequential progression from the abstract security policy 
to the concrete implementation, where each level is shown to map to the level above.  
The tool should also have the ability to automatically generate the full set of conjectures, 
based on the logic of the specification, which are required to prove the security and 
mapping theorems.  This is necessary in order to ensure that all obligations are satisfied 
and that subtle obligations are not overlooked.  And finally, the semantics of the 
verification system should be well founded such that the tool is expressive and does not 
prohibit efficient expression of system properties and formalisms.  Our analysis will 
consist of describing how well Specware incorporates these concepts.  Beyond these 
general requirements for verification of secure systems, several requirements are specific 
to certain systems and modeling approaches.  These requirements are that the tool suite 
should include a non-determinism checker, a flow analyzer, and a shared resource matrix 
generator.  We will discuss these requirements as future work and do not include them in 
our analysis of Specware. 
 
C. ANALYSIS OF SPECWARE 
1. Product Maturity 
When choosing to use a verification tool it is important that the tool has a 
reasonable level of maturity.  Product maturity has three measurable aspects: current 
product support, user training classes and tutorials, and quality of worked examples in the 
field.  Current support is important because the specifications being produced might 
require support from the tool’s developers in order to produce the correct semantics based 
on the syntactical elements of the language.  Support for the interface and development 
environment is also critical to timely and efficient production of specifications.  In 
addition, a more mature product might support training courses either from the vendor or 
a third party, which could prove valuable for new users and developers.  Product maturity 
is also important because it implies that the tool is actually in use on other projects, which 
can provide useful resources, documentation, and potential collaboration.  If the tool is 
not new and not in use on other projects, this should be a warning sign that the tool is not 
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very mature, not very useful, or has not succeeded in providing a beneficial alternative to 
other products.  In addition, more robust tutorials and examples covering a larger range of 
common issues might exist with a popular tool that has been on the market for a longer 
period of time. 
Specware has been under constant support and development since the mid 1990s.  
At the time of this writing it is in Version 4.1.3.  Customer support is readily available 
and custom queries are handled in a timely and efficient manner.  Although there does 
not exist a dedicated support group within Specware, it has been used on many projects to 
specify requirements and generate code.  Documentation regarding the theoretical 
foundations of Specware is easily found online.  Williamson mentions several projects 
which have used Specware [Wil01] including collaboration with Boeing, Motorola, and 
the NSA as noted by Widmaier [Wid00].  Specware can also provide training in the use 
of the tool and background in the language.  The current tutorial that is provided with 
Specware is a good example of requirements specification and refinement capabilities 
proceeding to code generation; however, the tutorial does not present an impressive 
display of the theorem prover and its automated verification capabilities.  Our analysis of 
the theorem prover will be presented later in this section.  Overall Specware is in a very 
mature state and has positive customer support.  It is popular for use in requirements 
specifications and for developing correct software. 
 
2. Usability of Tool and Verification Environment 
Within any development environment, the interface commands used to operate in 
the environment should be intuitive.  For projects with time constraints, spending more 
time learning the environment implies less time being spent on development.  The tool 
may be very powerful, but if users cannot function efficiently within the environment 
they may choose other tools of lesser quality, which may produce less satisfying results, 
but are easier to operate.  A graphical user interface (GUI) is also desired to avoid 
command line driven operations and to provide an integrated development environment 
(IDE).  However, the use of a GUI implies that its design is also adequate and simple.   If 
the GUI is not intuitive, then the command line interface might be more usable.  
Currently Specware operates in a command line driven basis.  Specware has its own shell 
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with unique commands used to perform certain operations on specifications.  The 
Specware shell can operate within XEmacs or as its own application outside of XEmacs.  
The XEmacs environment provides some features associated with an IDE such as the 
Specware menu that provides shortcuts to basic commands within the Specware shell.  
The XEmacs environment will also provide syntax highlighting of Specware 
specifications reflecting the syntax given in the Specware Language Manual [Kes04].  
These IDE-like features are only present in XEmacs if Specware is installed, thus these 
features are similar to a plug-in to XEmacs.  However, XEmacs does not provide a fully 
functional IDE as most commands to operate within Specware must still be given from 
the command prompt.  Commands that must be initiated from the shell include those 
associated with generating proof obligations as well as those for generating C and Java 
code. The commands to process and evaluate specifications within Specware are fairly 
simple and straightforward and are provided in the Specware user manual [Kes04].   
When developing the separation kernel model and FTLS, the usability of the 
Specware shell and development environment was not inhibiting or constrictive.  Overall, 
the Specware shell and commands were simple to understand and contained well 
documented support if any issues arose.  The Specware shell allows the user to interact 
efficiently with the system in order to perform the necessary operations upon the 
specifications.  Although it might be of interest to have a complete IDE that could be 
used to run Specware in the future, this could reside on top of the shell which provides 
the flexibility and power needed to produce and process specifications efficiently. 
The verification environment should help the developer to increase efficiency of 
producing specifications through features such as syntax highlighting, type checking, and 
error checking.  This is important because otherwise, specifications would be written in a 
simple text editor or even a on a piece of paper and it might be difficult to catch subtle 
errors or type inconsistencies.  If the development environment provides these features, 
the mistakes will be caught early in the process rather than persisting until the proof is 
attempted.  Currently Specware provides a syntax highlighting feature available through 
XEmacs, and when the proc command is issued from within the Specware shell, the 
processor checks the specification for type consistency as well as for common errors such 
as undefined parameters.  The error messages are provided directly in the Specware shell 
and when working in XEmacs, if an error is present, another buffer appears with the 
cursor placed at the line and column of the specification where error occurs.  When not 
working in XEmacs, the error is simply output to the Specware shell.  In both cases, the 
error messages contain the line and column position where the error occurs in the file.  
This provides the developer with a reference to be able to locate the error exactly.  An 
example of an error message is given in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21.   Specware Error Messages 
 
Notice that in Figure 21, the first error states that on line eighteen column twenty-
six through line eighteen column thirty-three, there is an error with the sort resource and 
consequently there are many more errors related to resource.  This type of error checking 
is important to avoid wasting time due to syntax errors when the proofs are attempted, 
thus increasing the efficiency of specification writing. 
 
3. Theorem Proving 
The theorem proving capabilities of a verification tool are very important since 
the entire goal of the verification paradigm is to prove certain properties regarding the 
security policy.  As noted previously there are two basic types of theorem provers, 
automated and interactive.  Interactive theorem provers allow the user to guide the prover 
in proof steps whereas the automated provers simply attempt the proofs without user 
intervention.  For small problems, model checkers can also be used, but for larger 
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problems model checkers cannot completely exhaust all possible states and offer little 
assurance.  Several characteristics distinguish theorem provers.  One useful characteristic 
is that the theorem prover should be easily integrated into the verification environment.  
For example, the specification processor should automatically prepare the specification to 
be input to the prover.  This means that the user does not need to modify the specification 
in order to be able to invoke the prover.  The theorem prover should also provide 
meaningful error messages when it finds errors or is unable to finish a proof.  In addition, 
the prover should have adequate capabilities to log attempted and completed proofs.  This 
is useful because it allows the user to trace the steps of the prover and perhaps recognize 
the problem if a proof has failed.  It also allows the user to trace through the steps of the 
proof upon success in order to gain better understanding of how the proof was 
formulated.   
Specware currently interfaces with the Snark first-order theorem prover [Kes04].  
Snark is an automated theorem prover and Specware automatically pre-processes 
specifications to send to the Snark prover.  Thus the user need not manipulate completed 
specifications in order to prove obligations and by issuing the prove command within the 
Specware shell, Specware will invoke Snark to prove a given unit.  Once Snark has been 
invoked it will automatically attempt a proof of the unit and will return with a message in 
the Specware shell indicating whether or not the conjecture or theorem was proved or 
not.  Snark also creates a log file of its processing on the given unit.  In its raw form, the 
log file is not intuitive, and its comprehension was beyond the scope of this thesis.  When 
a proof has succeeded, it is difficult to trace the log file to see what steps were taken to 
complete the proof.  Similarly, when a proof has failed, Snark does not generate any type 
of helpful error messages and tracing through the log file is not possible without training 
in Snark.  Figure 22 shows an unsuccessful proof attempt from within the Specware shell, 
Figure 23 shows a successful proof attempt and Figure 24 shows a snapshot of a Snark 
log file for the successful attempt.  Note however, that the structure of the log file is the 
same regardless of whether or not the proof was successful.  Even though the content of 
the log file is different based on success or failure, it remains extremely difficult to read 
without extensive knowledge of Snark. 
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* proc /test_oblig 
… 
Expanded spec file: /Program Files/Specware/Snark/..sw 
Snark Log file: /Program Files/Specware/Snark/..log 
Conjecture SecureOP_Obligation is NOT proved. using Snark. 
* 
Figure 22.   Unsuccessful Proof Message 
 
* proc /test_oblig 
… 
Expanded spec file: /Program Files/Specware/Snark/..sw 
Snark Log file: /Program Files/Specware/Snark/..log 
Theorem Secure in final_model#model is Proved! using 
Snark. 
* 
Figure 23.   Successful Proof Message 
 
    :NAME :|unary_minus_injective_on_positives|) 
  (SNARK::ASSERT 
     '(SNARK:ALL ((SNARK::|?n| :SORT NUMBER)) 
       (MES:IMPLIES (AND (>= SNARK::|?n| 0) 
                         (SNARK::|Nat.posNat?| 
SNARK::|?n|)) 




    :NAME :|minus_negative|) 
  (SNARK::ASSERT '(= (- 0 0) 0) :NAME :|minus_zero|) 
  (SNARK::ASSERT 
     '(SNARK:ALL ((SNARK::|?i| :SORT NUMBER)) 
       (= (- 0 (- 0 SNARK::|?i|)) SNARK::|?i|)) 
 
    :NAME :|unary_minus_involution|) 
  (SNARK::ASSERT '(SNARK::|Functions.bijective?| -) 
    :NAME :|unary_minus_bijective|) 
  (SNARK::ASSERT 
     '(SNARK:ALL ((SNARK::|?i| :SORT NUMBER)) 
       (AND (= (+ SNARK::|?i| 0) SNARK::|?i|) 
            (= (+ 0 SNARK::|?i|) SNARK::|?i|)))    :NAME 
:|unary_minus_injective_on_positives|) 
 
Figure 24.   Snapshot of Snark Log File 
 
Naturally it would be helpful to know why a conjecture did not prove and the only 
approach to figuring this out is to look into the log file given by Snark.  However, the log 
file does not provide a clean representation of the approach the prover took and every log 
file is of substantial length.  The log for the successful proof of the security theorem in 
the separation kernel model, partially shown in Figure 24, was eighty-seven pages long.  
However, through working with the proof obligations in Specware, we noticed that most 
of the other obligations did not prove in Snark even when it was intuitive that the 
obligation was provable.  In this case, without Snark training, the options are to verify the 
proof by hand or declare an axiom regarding the obligation in the specification. 
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Overall Snark does not succeed often in proving more complicated theorems and 
it seems necessary to construct the axioms and definitions in such a manner as to 
guarantee that the prover will succeed.  But this approach inhibits the developer and 
limits the clarity and expressiveness of specifications, which is not an acceptable option.  
For example, in an earlier version of our FTLS specification we included the ex1 
quantification in order to express that there exists a unique element in the set, which is 
perfectly acceptable in Specware’s MetaSlang.  When we attempted the proof of the 
theorem, the prover generated an error indicating that it could not handle the uniqueness 
quantification, resulting in a modification of the specification.  This is an example of a 
syntactic element in Specware that cannot be handled by the theorem prover.  In other 
cases the prover simply failed for unknown reasons.  In fact, the tutorial provided by 
Specware contains proof obligations that do not prove in Snark.  If the prover were 
interactive, the user might have more success in aiding the proof, and if the user were 
given more insight as to why the proof did not succeed, perhaps the specification could 
be tweaked to aid in the proof.  In addition, more intuitive error messages would also help 
to distinguish logic errors from the inadequacy of the theorem prover.   
In addition to Snark, Specware includes a simple inequality reasoning engine that 
attempts basic inequality proofs on conjectures before sending them to Snark.  This is 
useful for simple proofs, but it does not provide a log file associated with the proof.  A 
log would be useful for documentation purposes even though the developer might be able 
to sketch a proof by hand knowing that it can be proved using simple inequality 
reasoning.  Note that the inequality reasoning engine is not a part of Snark, rather it was 
developed by Kestrel for Specware.  Invoking the reasoning engine is not explicitly done 
by the user and the user does not need to do anything different when attempting to prove 
obligations. 
Thus the inadequate logging and error messages of Specware’s theorem prover, 
combined with its apparent weakness at automatically resolving logical propositions, 
means that seemingly simple proofs might not be proven.  Currently, the best approach 
for theorem proving in Specware is to generate the proof obligations, prove as many 
obligations as possible automatically, and then verify manually those obligations that did 
not succeed.  The proof units associated with all the obligations in our experiment are 
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given in Appendix D.  This includes the proof units as well as output from the Specware 
shell indicating whether or not the proof succeeded or failed for each conjecture. 
 
4. Specification Language 
As noted earlier Specware incorporates MetaSlang as its specification language, 
and the formal theory behind Specware is category theory.  MetaSlang is a functional 
language which can express powerful logical statements.  Functional languages represent 
computation as evaluations of mathematical functions as opposed to imperative 
languages which use the modification of state [Wik06].  Functional language expression 
is highly useful when defining predicates and composing axioms and theorems regarding 
requirements and constraints on the system.  When developing the Separation Kernel 
model and FTLS, we found the language powerful enough to express our requirements 
due to the static nature of the security policy.  A limitation of a functional language is its 
inability to represent state-based variables, state machines, and state transitions (e.g. x’ = 
x+1).  Currently the best approach to representing state when using a functional language 
is through the use of the Monad construct, described comprehensively by Wadler 
[Wad95].  We explored the use of Monads briefly, but did not complete the analysis and 
leave this exploration for future work.  One issue to explore is the implication that the use 
of Monads has on the proof obligations.   
The base libraries in Specware provide elements for expressing complex logical 
constructs (e.g. higher order quotients [Kes04]) based on the native base logic and 
continue to grow.  As Specware is used on more projects, the hope is that collaboration 
will aid in the growth of libraries, including those for addressing the state monads and 
state machine issues.  Williamson et. al. also noted some of these same areas for growth 
within Specware [Wil01*].  In our experiments the language was initially challenging to 
understand due to lack of multiple examples or exercises and it took some time to get 
used to the grammar.  This was due to the lack of experience within functional 
programming paradigm, which is important to keep in mind for developers coming from 
a background in imperative or procedural programming.  As familiarity with the language 
increased it also became evident that MetaSlang provides the ability to express constructs 
in a very terse manner, which led to confusion between developers.  For example, Figure 
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25 is taken from the List.sw library specification [Kes04].  The construct calculates the 
length of a list through the use of recursion.  The construct is concise but not necessarily 
intuitive at first glance.  This terseness could cause confusion and needs to be avoided in 
the specifications for high assurance systems.  A rule of thumb when developing high 
assurance systems is to be as clear as possible in order to avoid confusion even if there is 
a more efficient manner in which to write the expression. 
 
 
   op length          : [a]   List a -> Nat 
  def length l = 
    case l of 
       | []    -> 0 
       | _::tl -> 1 + (length tl) 
 
Figure 25.   Example of Terse MetaSlang  
 
The language also supports multiple layers of abstraction and includes native 
syntax for morphisms, as well as automatic generation of related proof obligations, 
allowing refinement, which is a necessity within the verification paradigm.  There are 
some minor syntactic peculiarities associated with the grammar, but naturally the more 
time a developer is involved with a language, the less distracting they become.  For 
example, the use of the “|” symbol has many different contexts such as use in the sum 
type, the case statement, and set comprehension (i.e. “such that”). 
 
5. Executable Specifications 
The ability to execute specifications allows developers the flexibility to 
experiment with the semantics of the system being specified while not having to address 
lower level implementation details.  Overall the use of executable specifications aids in 
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the efficiency of correctly constructing the system.  Specware supports the ability to 
execute certain expressions in MetaSlang, particularly constructive expressions.  A 
constructive expression is an expression where all types and ops have explicit definitions 
and do not include quantifications (i.e. ex, fa, ex1)[Kes04].  Constructive expressions are 
evaluated by setting the context of the Specware shell to the spec term itself and then 
invoking the eval <expression> command.  A built-in MetaSlang interpreter supports 
execution.  Figure 26 shows an example of an executable specification and Figure 27 
shows an example of a non-executable expression because it is non-constructive [Kes04]. 
 
 
  spec 
    def f x = 2*x+1 
    def t = 6172 
  endspec 
 
Figure 26.   Executable Specification 
 
 
  spec 
    def f x = 2*x+1 
    op t : Nat -> Nat 
  endspec 
 
Figure 27.   Non-Executable Specification 
 
The command eval f t for Figure 26 would result in 12345, whereas the command 
could not be executed for Figure 27.  This is a nice feature but is limited to constructive 
expressions and therefore not all specifications can be executed.  Thus to generally 
execute specifications, actual code would need to be generated but a specification might 
not be refined enough to generate the code.  Specware’s sister product, Planware, 
provides a framework for Libraries designed to provide the necessary refinements.  The 
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fact that Specware has the ability to generate code is a beneficial feature, because it 
allows for quicker testing once the specification has been refined to the point of possible 
code generation.  Even though Specware may not allow all specifications to be executed, 
it does allow for some execution and also provides the benefit of code generation from 
refined specifications. 
 
6. Multiple Levels of Abstraction 
A verification tool must be able to support multiple levels of abstraction in order 
to allow for the proper refinement from the security policy to the implementation.  This 
type of refinement is achieved through incremental steps moving from more abstract 
concepts at a higher level to more concrete details at the lower level.  Specware supports 
the process of refinement corroborated formally through category theoretic morphisms, 
colimits, and diagrams.  For a comprehensive understanding of category theory, readers 
are encouraged to investigate other resources and texts including Pierce [Pie91] and Barr 
[Bar90].  Our main investigation focused on the use of the morphism.  In Specware, the 
morphism is a structure- and property-preserving mapping between two specifications 
and their individual elements and operations.  All axioms and definitions (i.e. the 
semantics of the elements and operations) in the higher (source) spec become conjectures 
in the lower (target) spec.  Category theory provides the corollary that any theorems that 
are proved in the source spec need not be proved again in the target spec as long as the 
target spec is shown to uphold the axioms and definitions in the source.  For example, in 
our mapping from the Separation Kernel model to the FTLS, the axioms and definitions 
in the model became conjectures in the FTLS.  As long as we proved those conjectures, 
then the security theorem in the model will hold in the FTLS and does not need to be 
proved again.  Thus Specware supports multiple levels of abstraction very well and 
ensures proper refinement between levels, whereas a verification system without this 
support would impose the additional requirement to verify the correctness of the 
mapping-theorem logic. 
We mentioned in Chapter IV that we encountered a mapping problem in our 
initial approach to developing the model.  Initially, we defined three operations, each of 
which was to be a prototype for a class of FTLS transforms.  Thus one operation was 
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called a Read operation, one was called a Write, and the other a Read_Write, where each 
operation had the semantics that its effects contained the corresponding flows and the 
flows were allowed by the BB and SR policies.  When we developed the FTLS we wanted 
to define more than just three operations yet we wanted to map them to our original three 
operations in the model.  For example, we wanted to map HW_Read, Read_EventCT, and 
Await_EventCT back to the abstract Read function in the model.  However, this type of 
mapping is not allowed in Specware, in which the morphism requires a one-to-one 
mapping.  In order to satisfy the morphism, we collapsed the operations in the model into 
the operations axiom.  This allowed us to preserve the semantics of the prototype 
transform operations and also define a legal mapping.   
The only other problems we encountered when attempting the morphism between 
the separation kernel model and FTLS were problems regarding explicit mapping 
definitions.  Specware developers have indicated that these problems will not exist in 
future releases since the problems are not logical errors and preserve the morphism 
properties.  One problem was where we wanted to map the sum type Mode = | RD | WT | 
EXEC to the FTLS type Mode = | READ | WRITE | EXECUTE.  Specware did not allow 
this mapping because the types were named differently and there was no way to explicitly 
map each element of the sum type in the model to another partition of the sum type in the 
FTLS, e.g. RD +-> READ.  A similar problem with identifiers occurred when mapping 
types or objects of exactly the same type, but where different instantiated variables within 




 type Operation 
 op Read : {o1: Operation |  




 type Transformation 
 op HW_Read : {t1: Transformation |  
                       fa(e: Effect) member(e, t1)} 
 Mapping: 
     morphism Model +->  
                FTLS {Operation +-> Transformation, 
             Read +-> HW_Read} 
 
Figure 28.   Mapping Problem Example 
 
In the example shown in Figure 28 the Specware processor throws an error due to 
the t1 in the FTLS not being a o1 as it is in the model. Thus in the FTLS we must switch 
the t1 back to an o1.  This is strange since the o1 and t1 are simply arbitrary and we are 
concerned with their use being mapped correctly and not their names.   
These are minor problems that will hopefully be resolved in future releases of 
Specware.  Overall, the refinement capabilities within Specware are powerful and 
provide support for multiple layers of abstraction. 
 
7. Automatic Generation of Conjectures 
When working with intricate specifications, many proof obligations can be 
obvious to the developers, but some obligations may be subtle.  In these cases it is useful 
if the verification tool can automatically generate all of the conjectures to prove the 
soundness of the specification and mappings.  Specware supports the automatic 
generation of conjectures when the user issues the appropriate commands from within the 
Specware shell.  The show obligations in <unit> command displays the proof obligations 
that are not explicitly stated as conjectures or theorems within the specification.  For 
example, in our Separation Kernel model, a proof obligation is not displayed by the show 
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obligations command for the security theorem because it is an explicit obligation.  Once 
the command is issued, Specware generates a separate specification containing all of the 
conjectures that are not explicit.  Note that, this specification is output to the Specware 
shell and is not created as a separate file, so it is advisable to copy the output and store 
the specification as a separate file for future reference.  However, any obligations stated 
explicitly remain within the original specification.  In summary, obligations that are not 
stated explicitly in the specification are accessed by the show obligations command and 
all other obligations remain in the specification.  All proof attempts of obligations are 
performed using the prove command, followed by the unit and obligation name. 
Specware also automatically generates the conjectures that must be proved for a 
morphism in the same manner, where the morphism is treated as a separate unit.  This is 
valuable because developers need not worry about the obligations associated with each 
level of refinement as they are automatically generated by Specware.  In our generation 
of the morphism obligations, Specware generated two conjectures with the same name, 
seen in Figure 20 in Chapter IV and in Appendix G.  This made it difficult to attempt to 
prove the two conjectures as we could not verify which one was actually being attempted 
when we ran them in Snark.  This was later determined to be a bug in Specware.  
However, this was the only time we ran across two conjectures being generated with the 
same identifier.  Since the glitch we encountered revolved around unique identification, it 
should be easily fixed.  The fact that Specware still generated a necessary conjecture is a 
positive aspect of the system.  Thus, even though two conjectures had the same name, the 
conjectures were still generated and could be proved by hand in order to verify their 
correctness.   
Overall, Specware aids in ensuring that subtle obligations are addressed 
throughout the development of specifications.  Conjectures and theorems can be stated 
explicitly within the specification and can also be generated automatically by the 
Specware processor.  The proof obligations generated by Specware for the separation 





The underlying logic and foundational theory behind a verification tool is 
important because this directly affects the expressiveness of the tool and the assurance 
provided.  We have previously discussed that the underlying foundational theories for 
Specware are category theory and lambda calculus as apparent in the functional language 
paradigm.  This foundation allows Specware to express higher order logic and refinement 
with minimal complexity.  However, there were some challenges associated with 
developing our separation kernel model and FTLS.  Some linguistic problems we faced 
were based on ambiguities in the use of certain symbols.  For example, the * can either 
imply a product in the literal sense, such as multiplication of integers, or it could be used 
as a separator between input parameters in a function (e.g. Subject*Resource -> Flow).  
The use of the * in the latter example implies a cross product of the “sets” of inputs.  
Those not familiar with the functional language paradigm might find the “overloading” of 
the * symbol to be ambiguous and perhaps a different symbol would be beneficial for the 
sake of clarity.  The major problem we faced when familiarizing ourselves with the 
language was determining how to express the logic that we could verbalize quite easily.  
This problem could easily be overcome with more robust documentation and explanation 
of logic within tutorial examples and specifications.  It took some time to understand 
what certain example expressions were saying and it took time to determine the best way 
to express what we wanted to formalize for our specifications.  Thus the foundational 
theory and semantics of Specware is very powerful, but there are some linguistic 
idiosyncrasies that must be overcome in order to utilize the full capability of Specware  
 
D. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have provided an analysis of Specware based on a set of 
evaluation criteria.  We discussed the strengths of Specware as well as problems 
encountered regarding the development of the Separation Kernel model, FTLS, and 
morphism between the two specifications.  The next section will discuss our conclusions 






























VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS OF ANALYSIS 
The construction of the separation kernel formal model and FTLS within 
Specware allowed us to assess the role Specware can play in the verification of high 
assurance systems.  As noted previously, a verification tool consists of a specification 
language and theorem proving capabilities.  Overall we found that Specware is a 
powerful tool that has a solid foundational theory allowing it to express higher order logic 
in a simple and concise manner.  In terms of the specification language, Specware is in a 
mature state and has been used in many commercial and research projects.  Theorem 
proving support in Specware needs some improvement, as we will discuss later in this 
section.  The Specware shell and development environment is not complicated, allowing 
developers to quickly become familiar and comfortable with Specware.  However, 
Specware does not contain a fully integrated development environment.  This might be a 
desirable feature that would increase its efficiency and usability.  The Specware 
processor supports error checking.  The error messages are terse and sometimes it is 
difficult to distinguish the actual error, but overall they provide sufficient context to 
locate the problem.  Thus the Specware environment is adequate for developing formal 
specifications and certainly does not provide a hindrance to the development lifecycle. 
The specification language, MetaSlang, incorporated by Specware is a powerful 
and expressive language.  MetaSlang is a functional language which is valuable in terms 
of verification, but it has difficulty representing state based variables.  Representation of 
state leads to the use of monads and future work will hopefully reveal what challenges 
this might present to verification of specifications.  We will discuss potential future work 
regarding verification of specifications which incorporate monads later in this section.  
The refinement capabilities in Specware definitely support the goals of multiple 
levels of abstraction needed in the verification paradigm.  The morphism provides the 
necessary and sufficient mechanism to show that a lower level specification preserves the 
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security properties1 of the level above.  Specware also succeeds in its ability to express 
theorems and conjectures concisely in addition to the capability to automatically generate 
conjectures.  The automatic generation of conjectures in Specware ensures that subtle 
obligations will not be overlooked.  Specware also generates automatic conjectures when 
performing a morphism, which provides a means to prove the interlevel mapping. Aside 
from a few minor problems with the mapping syntax and semantics, Specware succeeds 
in providing an effective means to express multiple levels of abstraction and automatic 
generation of conjectures.   
The theorem proving capabilities are the biggest area for improvement.  Currently 
Specware interfaces with the automated theorem prover Snark.  Snark is deficient in 
multiple ways including insufficient logging capabilities such that it is difficult for the 
user to verify the proof, or lack thereof, based on the generated log.  It also struggles with 
proving relatively simple theorems providing no intuitive indication as to the reason for 
failure.  The error messages are not typically helpful and will only indicate that the 
theorem proved or did not prove.  The theorem prover drawbacks are naturally an initial 
deterrent when considering Specware for use in the verification paradigm, due to the fact 
that proofs will not be guaranteed unless produced by hand.  We understand that most 
projects using Specware forego the actual proving of theorems.  One example of not 
relying on the theorem prover was noted by Widmaier [Wid00].  Within the context of 
the verification of high assurance systems, proofs are a necessity not only to verify that 
the system satisfies the security policy, but also to meet desired evaluation assurance 
levels with respect to criteria (e.g. Common Criteria).  Since Specware is not a theorem 
prover in and of itself, this problem can be solved relatively simply without the need to 
restructure the entire foundation of Specware.  An interface to other theorem provers 
appears to be the major feature needed.  To add versatility to the users and projects a 
generic interface would allow users to choose which prover they would like to use either 
based on familiarity or other requirements.  For instance, some users may wish to know 
that the simple theorems can be proved, a job well suited for an automated prover or 
 
1 This thesis examined the preservation of flow properties from the perspective of subjects and their 
effects on exported resources.  Other research has shown that a noninterference property from the 
perspective of traces might not be preserved by refinement unless the specifications are bi-similar (i.e. at 
the same level of detail) [Bib05] 
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model checker.  Other users wish to know the formulation of the proof or provide the 
proof as documentation, which can be provided by an interactive theorem prover.  These 
are examples of reasons to integrate Specware with multiple theorem provers, but the 
main issue is confidence in the proving capabilities.  If a theorem is not proved the prover 
should indicate why and the path it took to the reach the point of failure.  We will discuss 
integration with other theorem provers as future work. 
In conclusion, through our analysis of Specware, we feel that Specware has the 
necessary components to serve as a verification system for high assurance system 
development, provided the improvement upon the theorem proving capabilities occurs.  
More research is required to understand the use of  MetaSlang for state-machine formal 
models.  We are aware that efforts are being made to improve these weaknesses and 
under that assumption, Specware can be very useful in the verification of high assurance 
systems.  Specware provides a powerful specification language and is an excellent system 
to produce high assurance software.  Furthermore, verification of high assurance systems 
can be enhanced with automatic code generation, although this aspect of formal system 
development was not investigated.  Specware takes an average amount of time to become 
familiar with but features excellent support.  It has great potential for use as a verification 
system in the development of high assurance systems. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Integrated Development Environment 
Providing a stand alone distribution that incorporates the Specware processor 
underneath an integrated development environment (IDE) would be beneficial to the 
overall efficiency of developing formal specifications.  An IDE would allow developers 
to create, process, and verify specifications with better organization and more graphical 
interaction.  This would allow users to install one application to get benefits such as 
syntax highlighting, as opposed to first requiring XEmacs.  An example of this type of 
IDE would be similar to Microsoft Visual Studio, or NetBeans for Java.  We feel that this 
type of environment can also aid in the organization of Specware libraries where the IDE 
can manage the paths to the libraries regardless of the path under which the current 
specification is being developed.  The IDE could also provide better organization of the 
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proof units associated with a project.  Currently, the best way to handle the units is to 
place them in a separate file, but an IDE could provide a display of all obligations and an 
interactive dialog that would display obligations that have been attempted as well as 
indicate their success or failure.  The IDE recommendation is merely a suggestion to 
provide more continuity throughout the process of development and verification within 
Specware. 
 
2. Theorem Prover Integration 
Integration efforts between Specware and multiple theorem provers would be 
valuable to aid in the confidence of proving capabilities associated with Specware as well 
as provide versatility to the developers.  Currently Specware only interfaces with one 
automated theorem prover that lacks the power needed to be used in the verification of 
high assurance systems.  This results in a lack of user confidence in Specware’s theorem 
proving capabilities and Specware as a complete verification system.  Developing the 
capability to interface Specware with alternate theorem provers such as PVS or Isabelle 
HOL would allow Specware to be used in a much broader set of verification 
environments.  This integration would allow theorems to be proved on multiple platforms 
thus decreasing the amount of manual verification.  For example, if a theorem could not 
be proved in Snark, perhaps the theorem could be proved in PVS, and if not in PVS, 
hopefully in HOL or even another theorem prover.  Research into integrating Specware 
with other theorem provers would improve the versatility and capability of Specware as a 
verification system. 
 
C. FUTURE WORK 
1. Verification of State Representation in Specware 
The use of monads to represent state in Specware is a feasible option and can be 
implemented.  The monadic structure can be complex and implementation requires 
careful attention.  The question for research is the effect that monads have on verification 
of the basic security theorem.  It would be useful to develop formal specifications against 
a security policy that used monads to represent system state.  Then we would like to 
attempt to prove conjectures and a basic security theorem.  Creating a refinement of a 
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more abstract specification and being able to prove the mapping when each level uses 
monads to represent state would verify that Specware can incorporate verification of 
state-based specifications.  The level of difficulty associated with such proofs would be a 
good point for analysis.  This would prove useful for developers needing to not only 
incorporate state within formal specifications, but would also satisfy the need to prove 
security properties regarding state in the system. 
 
2. Trusted Computing Exemplar 
The Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX) project is an ongoing research effort to 
develop a high assurance least privilege separation kernel [Lev04].  The model and FTLS 
we developed for this thesis can be enhanced to accommodate all of the requirements for 
the TCX separation kernel.  Enhancements include incorporating a notion of initialization 
of the policy tables within in the model.  This initialization can occur at boot up of the 
system or during runtime, requiring an interface which accesses multiple policies.  The 
model would also need to specify a trusted partial ordering on the flows between blocks 
for the identification of “trusted subjects”.  The TCX project has certain requirements 
regarding the verification system used and we have addressed all of those requirements in 
our analysis of Specware except for a few, which can be met by hand or potentially with 
another tool.  These requirements include the need for a non-determinism checker, static 
flow analyzer, and shared resource matrix generator.  Note that these are optional 
requirements for which tool-based support would be desirable within the TCX project, 
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APPENDIX A: SEPARATION KERNEL MODEL IN SPECWARE 
This appendix is the Separation Kernel Model as described in Chapter IV. 
 
model = spec 
  %Types 
     type Resource 
 
       op exported? : Resource -> Boolean 
     type Exported_Resource  = (Resource | exported?) 
 
       op subject? : Exported_Resource -> Boolean 
     type Subject = (Exported_Resource | subject?) 
 
     type Block = | High | Medium | Low 
     type Mode = | RD | WT | RW | NULL 
     type Effect = {subject: Subject, 
                    resource: Exported_Resource, 
                    flow: Mode} 




  %Definitions 
       op active? : [a] a -> Boolean 
      
  %BB and SR represent the policy tables 
       op BB : {(b1,b2): Block*Block | active? (b1)}-> List Mode 
       op SR : {(s1,r2): Subject*Exported_Resource | active? (s1)}-> List Mode 




  %Policy Description 
       op SecureEffect : Effect -> Boolean 
      def SecureEffect (effect) =  
    (effect.flow = NULL || 
     (member(effect.flow, BB(Partition(effect.subject),  
            Partition(effect.resource))) && 
      member(effect.flow, SR(effect.subject, effect.resource)))) 
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       op SecureOP : Operation -> Boolean 
      def SecureOP (operation) = case operation of 
                            | nil -> true 
                            | Cons(hd, tl) -> (SecureEffect(hd) && 




   %Axiom 
    axiom operations is 
          fa(e: Effect, o: Operation)  
              member(e,o) =>  
                 (e.flow = RD && 
                  member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject), 
                                    Partition(e.resource))) && 
                  member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource))) 
                 || 
                 (e.flow = WT && 
                  member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject),  
                                    Partition(e.resource))) && 
                  member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource))) 
                 || 
                 (e.flow = RW &&  
                  member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject),  
                                    Partition(e.resource))) && 




  %Theorem 
  theorem Secure is 
          fa(o: Operation) SecureOP(o) 
endspec 
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APPENDIX B: SEPARATION KERNEL FTLS IN SPECWARE 
This appendix is the Separation Kernel FTLS as described in Chapter IV. 
 
ftls = spec 
  %Types 
     type Object = | Process {id: Nat} 
                   | Segment {id: Nat, size: Nat} 
                   | EventCT (Nat) 
                   | Sequencer (Nat) 
 
       op exported? : Object -> Boolean 
     type Exp_Object = (Object | exported?) 
 
       op subject? : Exp_Object -> Boolean 
      def subject? (process) = ex(n: Nat) process = Process {id=n} 
     type Subject = (Exp_Object | subject?) 
 
     type Block = | High | Medium | Low 
     type Mode = | RD | WT | RW | NULL 
     type Effect = {subject: Subject, 
                    resource: Exp_Object, 
                    flow: Mode} 
     type Transform = List Effect 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  %Definitions 
       op active? : [a] a -> Boolean 
      
  %CurrentAccess represents the process local descriptor table 
       op CurrentAccess : Subject * Exp_Object * Mode -> Boolean 
 
  %BB and SR represent the policy tables        
 op BB : {(b1,b2): Block*Block | active? (b1}} -> List Mode 
 op SR : {(s1,r2): Subject*Exp_Object | active? (s1)} -> List Mode 
 op Partition : Exp_Object -> Block 
 
    axiom CurrentAccess_implies_SR is 
          fa(e: Effect)  
      CurrentAccess(e.subject, e.resource, e.flow) => 
             member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource)) 
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    axiom SR_implies_BB is 
          fa(e: Effect)  
      member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource)) => 




  %Policy Description 
       op SecureEffect : Effect -> Boolean 
      def SecureEffect (effect) =  
    (effect.flow = NULL || 
     (member(effect.flow, BB(Partition(effect.subject),  
             Partition(effect.resource)))  
      && 
      member(effect.flow, SR(effect.subject, effect.resource)))) 
 
       op SecureOP : Transform -> Boolean 
      def SecureOP (transform) = case transform of 
                            | nil -> true 
                            | Cons(hd, tl) -> (SecureEffect(hd) && 




       op HW_Read : 
        {t1: Transform | fa(e: Effect) member(e, t1) =>  
                                        (e.flow = RD && 
                                         CurrentAccess(e.subject, 
                                                       e.resource, 
                                                       e.flow))} 
 
       op HW_Write : 
        {t2: Transform | fa(e: Effect) member(e, t2) =>  
                                        (e.flow = WT &&  
                                         CurrentAccess(e.subject,  
                                                       e.resource,  






       op HW_Read_Write :  
        {t3: Transform | fa(e: Effect) member(e, t3) =>  
                                        (e.flow = RW &&  
                                         CurrentAccess(e.subject,  
                                                       e.resource,  
                                                       e.flow))} 
 
       op Ticket : 
        {t4: Transform | fa(e: Effect) (member(e, t4) => 
                                         (e.flow = RW &&  
                                          CurrentAccess(e.subject,  
                                                        e.resource,  
                                                        e.flow))) 
                                          && 
                                          length(t4) = 1} 
 
       op Read_EventCT : 
        {t5: Transform | fa(e: Effect) (member(e, t5) => 
                                         (e.flow = RD &&  
                                          CurrentAccess(e.subject, 
                                                        e.resource, 
                                                        e.flow))) 
                                          && 
                                          length(t5) = 1} 
 
       op Adv_EventCT : 
        {t6: Transform | fa(e: Effect) (member(e, t6) => 
                                         (e.flow = WT &&  
                                          CurrentAccess(e.subject, 
                                                        e.resource, 
                                                        e.flow))) 
                                          && 
                                          length(t6) = 1} 
 
       op Await_EventCT : 
        {t7: Transform | fa(e: Effect) (member(e, t7) => 
                                         (e.flow = RD &&  
                                          CurrentAccess(e.subject, 
                                                        e.resource, 
                                                        e.flow))) 
                                          && 
                                          length(t7) = 1} 
72 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  
  %Axioms 
    axiom only_ops is 
          fa(t:Transform) t = HW_Read       ||  
                          t = HW_Write      ||  
                          t = HW_Read_Write || 
                          t = Ticket        || 
                          t = Read_EventCT  || 
                          t = Adv_EventCT   || 
                          t = Await_EventCT  
     
    axiom Segment_as_Object is 
          fa(e: Effect, t: Transform) 
            ex(n1: Nat, n2: Nat) 
             ((t = HW_Read)       ||  
              (t = HW_Write)      ||  
              (t = HW_Read_Write))  
             && 
             member(e, t) => e.resource = Segment{id=n1, size=n2} 
 
    axiom EventCT_as_Object is 
          fa(e: Effect, t: Transform) 
            ex(n: Nat) 
             ((t = Read_EventCT)   || 
              (t = Adv_EventCT)    || 
              (t = Await_EventCT))  
             && 
             member(e, t) => e.resource = EventCT (n) 
 
    axiom Ticket_as_Object is 
          fa(e: Effect, t: Transform) 
      ex(n: Nat) 
      (t = Ticket) && 




APPENDIX C: MORPHISM FROM MODEL TO FTLS 
This appendix displays the morphism unit defined in Specware for the mapping 
between the Separation Kernel Model and FTLS as described in Chapter IV. 
 
Mapping = morphism final_model#model -> 
                         final_ftls#ftls{Resource +-> Object, 
                                         Exported_Resource +-> Exp_Object, 






























































APPENDIX D: SEPARATION KERNEL PROOF UNITS 
This appendix provides all of the proof units for the Separation Kernel Model, 
FTLS, and morphism.  Included with each proof unit is a snapshot of the output for each 
attempt indicating the success or failure of each proof. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%model_oblig1-3 did not prove, model_oblig4-9 and Security Theorem did prove 
model_oblig = obligations rev_final_model#model  
 
model_oblig1 = prove SecureEffect_Obligation in model_oblig  
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../model_oblig1.log 
  %model_oblig1: Conjecture SecureEffect_Obligation in model_oblig is NOT 
proved using Snark. 
 
model_oblig2 = prove SecureEffect_Obligation0 in model_oblig  
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../model_oblig2.log 
  %model_oblig2: Conjecture SecureEffect_Obligation0 in model_oblig is NOT 
proved using Snark. 
 
model_oblig3 = prove SecureOP_Obligation in model_oblig  
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../model_oblig3.log 
  %model_oblig3: Conjecture SecureOP_Obligation in model_oblig is NOT proved 
using Snark. 
 
model_oblig4 = prove operations_Obligation in model_oblig  
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../model_oblig4.log 






model_oblig5 = prove operations_Obligation0 in model_oblig  
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../model_oblig5.log 
  %model_oblig5: Conjecture operations_Obligation0 in model_oblig is Proved! 
using Snark. 
 
model_oblig6 = prove operations_Obligation1 in model_oblig  
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../model_oblig6.log 
  %model_oblig6: Conjecture operations_Obligation1 in model_oblig is Proved! 
using Snark. 
 
model_oblig7 = prove operations_Obligation2 in model_oblig  
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../model_oblig7.log 
  %model_oblig7: Conjecture operations_Obligation2 in model_oblig is Proved! 
using Snark. 
 
model_oblig8 = prove operations_Obligation3 in model_oblig  
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../model_oblig8.log 
  %model_oblig8: Conjecture operations_Obligation3 in model_oblig is Proved! 
using Snark. 
 
model_oblig9 = prove operations_Obligation4 in model_oblig  
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../model_oblig9.log 
  %model_oblig9: Conjecture operations_Obligation4 in model_oblig is Proved! 
using Snark. 
 
Model_Security_Theorem = prove Secure in model_oblig 
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../Model_Security_Theorem.log 







%ftls_oblig1-4, ftls_oblig6 did not prove, but ftls_oblig5 did prove 
ftls_oblig = obligations rev_final_ftls#ftls  
 
ftls_oblig1 = prove CurrentAccess_implies_SR_Obligation in ftls_oblig  
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../ftls_oblig1.log 
  %ftls_oblig1: Conjecture CurrentAccess_implies_SR_Obligation in ftls_oblig is 
NOT proved using Snark. 
 
ftls_oblig2 = prove SR_implies_BB_Obligation in ftls_oblig  
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../ftls_oblig2.log 
  %ftls_oblig2: Conjecture SR_implies_BB_Obligation in ftls_oblig is NOT proved 
using Snark. 
 
ftls_oblig3 = prove SR_implies_BB_Obligation0 in ftls_oblig  
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../ftls_oblig3.log 
  %ftls_oblig3: Conjecture SR_implies_BB_Obligation0 in ftls_oblig is NOT 
proved using Snark. 
 
ftls_oblig4 = prove SecureEffect_Obligation in ftls_oblig  
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../ftls_oblig4.log 
  %ftls_oblig4: Conjecture SecureEffect_Obligation in ftls_oblig is NOT proved 
using Snark. 
 
ftls_oblig5 = prove SecureEffect_Obligation0 in ftls_oblig  
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../ftls_oblig5.log 







ftls_oblig6 = prove SecureOP_Obligation in ftls_oblig  
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../ftls_oblig6.log 




%mapping_oblig1&2 did not prove 
%mapping_oblig3-5 proved using simple inequality reasoning 
 
mapping_oblig = obligations rev_final_ftls#Mapping 
 
mapping_oblig1 = prove operations in mapping_oblig 
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../mapping_oblig2.log 
  %mapping_oblig2: Conjecture operations in mapping_oblig is NOT proved using 
Snark. 
 
mapping_oblig2 = prove SecureEffect_def in mapping_oblig 
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../mapping_oblig3.log 
  %mapping_oblig3: Axiom SecureEffect_def in mapping_oblig is Proved! using 
simple inequality reasoning. 
 
mapping_oblig3 = prove SecureOP_def in mapping_oblig 
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../mapping_oblig4.log 
  %mapping_oblig4: Axiom SecureOP_def in mapping_oblig is Proved! using simple 
inequality reasoning. 
 
mapping_oblig4 = prove SecureOP_def in mapping_oblig 
  %Snark Log file: H:/.../mapping_oblig5.log 
   %mapping_oblig5: Axiom SecureOP_def in mapping_oblig is Proved! using simple 
inequality reasoning. 
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APPENDIX E: SEPARATION KERNEL MODEL PROOF 
OBLIGATIONS 
This appendix displays the output of the automatically generated proof obligations 
for the Separation Kernel Model. 
import /Library/Base/WFO 
conjecture SecureEffect_Obligation is  
    fa(effect : Effect)  
      ~(effect.flow = NULL) => active?(Partition(effect.subject)) 
 
conjecture SecureEffect_Obligation0 is  
    fa(effect : Effect)  
     ~(effect.flow = NULL)  
     && member(effect.flow, BB(Partition(effect.subject), 
                               Partition(effect.resource))) 
     => active?(effect.subject) 
 
conjecture SecureOP_Obligation is  
    ex(pred : List(Effect) * List(Effect) -> Boolean)  
     WFO.wfo pred  
     && (fa(operation : Operation, tl : List(Effect), hd : Effect)  
          (operation = Cons(hd, tl) && SecureEffect hd => pred(tl, operation))) 
 
 conjecture operations_Obligation is  
    fa(e : Effect, o : Operation)  






conjecture operations_Obligation0 is  
    fa(e : Effect, o : Operation)  
     member(e, o)  
     && e.flow = RD  
     && member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject), Partition(e.resource)))  
     => active?(e.subject) 
 
conjecture operations_Obligation1 is  
    fa(e : Effect, o : Operation)  
     member(e, o)  
     && ~(e.flow = RD  
           && member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject), Partition(e.resource)))  
           && member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource))) 
     && e.flow = WT  
     => active?(Partition(e.subject)) 
 
conjecture operations_Obligation2 is  
    fa(e : Effect, o : Operation)  
     member(e, o)  
     && ~(e.flow = RD  
           && member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject), Partition(e.resource)))  
           && member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource)))  
     && e.flow = WT  
     && member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject), Partition(e.resource)))  








conjecture operations_Obligation3 is  
    fa(e : Effect, o : Operation)  
     member(e, o)  
     && ~(e.flow = RD  
           && member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject), Partition(e.resource)))  
           && member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource)))  
     && ~(e.flow = WT  
           && member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject), Partition(e.resource)))  
           && member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource)))  
     && e.flow = RW  
     => active?(Partition(e.subject)) 
 
conjecture operations_Obligation4 is  
    fa(e : Effect, o : Operation)  
     member(e, o)  
     && ~(e.flow = RD  
           && member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject), Partition(e.resource)))  
           && member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource)))  
     && ~(e.flow = WT  
           && member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject), Partition(e.resource)))  
           && member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource)))  
     && e.flow = RW  
     && member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject), Partition(e.resource)))  


















































APPENDIX F: SEPARATION KERNEL FTLS PROOF 
OBLIGATIONS 
This appendix displays the output of the automatically generated proof obligations 
for the Separation Kernel FTLS. 
import /Library/Base/WFO 
conjecture CurrentAccess_implies_SR_Obligation is  
    fa(e : Effect)  
     CurrentAccess(e.subject, e.resource, e.flow) 
     => active?(e.subject) 
 
conjecture SR_implies_BB_Obligation is  
    fa(e : Effect)  
     active?(e.subject) 
 
conjecture SR_implies_BB_Obligation0 is  
    fa(e : Effect)  
     member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource))  
     => active?(Partition(e.subject)) 
 
conjecture SecureEffect_Obligation is  
    fa(effect : Effect)  
     ~(effect.flow = NULL)  








conjecture SecureEffect_Obligation0 is  
    fa(effect : Effect)  
     ~(effect.flow = NULL)  
     && member(effect.flow, BB(Partition(effect.subject), 
                               Partition(effect.resource)))  
     => active?(effect.subject) 
 
conjecture SecureOP_Obligation is  
    ex(pred : List(Effect) * List(Effect) -> Boolean)  
     WFO.wfo pred  
     && (fa(transform : Transform, tl : List(Effect), hd : Effect)  
          (transform = Cons(hd, tl) 
           && SecureEffect hd 


























APPENDIX G: SEPARATION KERNEL MORPHISM PROOF 
OBLIGATIONS 
This appendix displays the output of the automatically generated proof obligations 
for the Separation Kernel morphism. 
import /H:/.../rev_final_ftls#ftls 
conjecture operations is  
    fa(e : Effect, o : Transform)  
     member(e, o)  
     => e.flow = RD  
        && member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject), Partition(e.resource)))  
        && member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource))  
     || e.flow = WT  
        && member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject), Partition(e.resource)))  
        && member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource))  
     || e.flow = RW  
        && member(e.flow, BB(Partition(e.subject), Partition(e.resource)))  
        && member(e.flow, SR(e.subject, e.resource)) 
 
conjecture SecureEffect_def is  
    fa(effect : Effect)  
     SecureEffect effect =  
       (effect.flow = NULL  
        || member(effect.flow, BB(Partition(effect.subject), 
                                  Partition(effect.resource)))  
           && member(effect.flow, SR(effect.subject, effect.resource))) 
 
conjecture SecureOP_def is  
    fa(nil : Operation)  
     fa(operation : Operation)  
86 
      nil = operation => SecureOP operation = true 
 
 
conjecture SecureOP_def is  
    fa(hd : Effect, tl : List(Effect))  
     fa(operation : Operation)  
      ~(nil = operation) 
      && Cons(hd, tl) = operation  
      => SecureOP operation = (SecureEffect hd && SecureOP tl) 
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